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Abstract 
Our contemporary world is characterized by the importance of human rights but also how these 
rights should be reachable and trainable for people around the whole world. In order to make human 
rights reachable for people in every corner of the world we enjoy the international community which 
is characterized by their liberal will to put individuals on top of each agenda. The international 
community further work under democratic and individual friendly principles. Unfortunately our 
world does not look as bright as one might have hoped for as people all over the world are being 
denied basic rights, killed, harassed and tortured. How come our powerful international community 
let these kinds of disasters occur? Many scholars and many debates mean that these problems can 
only be sorted out by interventions or peacekeeping operations. But what is more interesting is that 
scholars have different opinion concerning peacekeeping operations, some believe that interventions 
are not carried out when actors do not have any interests in the region which is referred to realism, 
others mean that it is a moral obligation to intervene and help people in need which is connected to 
liberalism. The case of Kosovo is a very interesting case study within the field of international 
relations and peacekeeping missions as the international community argued that they had to stop 
the violence that the Albanians were being exposed to thus the intervention from NATO in 1999. 
Their agreements read that it was under the name of human rights and liberalism that the 
intervention was carried out. The mandate in Kosovo also implied that the international forces 
should stay and work towards stability in Kosovo after the war but also help improve the situation for 
the citizens and more specifically for minorities. Unfortunately locals, international debates and 
organizations such as Human Rights Watch believed that the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo 
failed. These arguments therefore lead one to believe that the time after the war in Kosovo was 
pointing towards a realist nature instead of a liberal one. Events in 2004, during March, pointed 
towards failure of the liberal promises that the international community addressed. Unfortunately it 
is very difficult to investigate what kind of nature the aftermath of the war actually had as the case 
study of Kosovo and especially the events of March showed a combination of both theories. It further 
showed that it is not fair to only blame the international organizations for not living up to their liberal 
purposes as the burden should fall on all parts, including the government of Kosovo. The conclusion 
is therefore that it is very difficult to categorize the case of Kosovo to have a realist nature or a liberal 
nature as the issue is more complex than that. By not living up to promises means that they failed 
liberalism and by arguing that American interests were a factor for the intervention points toward 
realism. The United States had many different motives for pushing for an intervention; motives that 
might be considered as realism, but liberalism should not be ruled out as by carrying out an 
intervention and working in a conflict prone area should point towards a liberal nature in Kosovo. 
Obviously the two theories are each other’s opposites, but still the line that separates them when 
evaluating the nature of interventions is very thin but yet very complex.   
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1. Introduction  
Our contemporary world is characterized and linked to the huge; reaching all parts of the 
world, organization named United Nations (UN). This phenomenon is what one might believe 
signifies our time. The highly respected organization has in recent years developed their aims 
and is highly involved in sorting out and settling conflicts around the world. Their main 
missions are to respect and implement human rights, to establish safety for people and to 
create peace around the world. These goals and tasks are often linked to humanitarian 
interventions. Studies and scholars point out that humanitarian interventions happen 
selectively, which is a shame as it means that respect for the individual and human rights are 
not treasured. According to the UN this should strictly be forbidden; every individual has the 
same value and should be able to enjoy rights. But unfortunately history has taught us that 
when interests are involved it is more common that an intervention is carried out. Obviously 
there are a lot of other factors that are involved in why humanitarian interventions and 
peacekeeping operations are implemented or not. This means that there is never a concrete 
answer to why humanitarian interventions or other operations are passed. What on the other 
hand is interesting concerning interventions is that it is always argued that they are carried out 
based on liberal notions. The main reason for carrying out such an action is based on the will 
to help people in need. Carrying out a humanitarian intervention or a peacekeeping operation 
are therefore liberal actions as they intends to help people that are denied basic rights. This 
statement can be confusing as many scholars argue that interventions happen selectively. If 
these actions were based on liberal ideas one would think that every conflict -prone region 
should be characterized with an intervention. So the question should therefore be; which 
statement is true, the one claiming that interventions are based on liberal notions and should 
be introduced in regions characterized by conflict or the one claiming that interventions 
happen selectively and are therefore not introduced into regions where no interests or benefits 
are involved? Our contemporary world is also characterized by globalization but also our 
international community with both governmental- and non-governmental organizations which 
put high value on human rights. It is shameful to state that even though our world entails all 
these advantages many places are still not able to utilize human rights that should be 
guaranteed to them. At the same time our current world is distinguished by conflicts and 
discrimination. One might think that globalization and the importance of the international 
community would be able to help and solve unfairness’s around the world. One might also 
think that the world would be fair and safe as that is the role that the international community 
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has drawn upon themselves, sadly enough this is not the case as people all over the world 
question the credibility of organizations as well as the international community. The reason 
behind this is because they do not always live up to their full potential. Statements such as 
human rights, minority rights and democracy are just to be considered as empty words or 
empty promises for many people. Over and over again we have witnessed the involvement of 
the international community trying to settle conflicts, which they many times have done, but 
leaving the regions and people after the main disputes are solved is not what it means to fight 
for human rights. Fighting for human rights entails offering people rights and security, not 
leaving them when their help is needed the most. It is not hard ending a conflict as it is known 
that military advantages can do that, the challenges are what comes afterwards. Help from the 
international community is needed afterwards as they should be the ones helping with 
restoring the region and establishing a peaceful and democratic society. A region that has 
been characterized by war and conflict obviously does not have the resources, power or 
knowledge to strive for sustainable peace and democracy, help is needed, and it is here when 
the international community many times turns their back on regions and people that are 
desperate for guidance.  
After working on my bachelor thesis, which revolves around the phenomenon humanitarian 
interventions I want to continue on the same path for my master thesis, obviously the thesis 
will have a completely different path and a different analysis. The conclusion of my bachelor 
thesis was that the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo (the region was one of the cases that 
were analyzed) was a liberal intervention and was considered to fully be based on liberal 
notions. The reason for intervening was that the people in Kosovo were in need of assistance, 
help and implementation of human rights. The international community argued that it was 
their responsibility to protect the people as the own state was not capable of doing so. They 
referred to the doctrine Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and implied that the same mistakes 
that were made in Bosnia and Somalia were not about to be repeated, therefore in paper the 
intervention was liberally formulated. My thesis intend to take the issue of Kosovo to the next 
stage by trying to investigate what really happened in Kosovo and if the intervention really 
was based on liberal ideas. The international community firmly formulated and showed 
willpower to straight out the situation in Kosovo but how come that the situation in Kosovo, 
after the intervention, accelerated to a disaster? What happened to the promises about 
implementing human rights? This thesis will therefore mostly be based on peacekeeping 
operations as such an action characterized Kosovo after the war. To do a deeper analysis of 
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the humanitarian intervention and the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo would also mean 
that it can strengthen the notion that humanitarian interventions happen selectively. But the 
thesis can also show that the intervention in Kosovo was purely liberal and that the ideas 
behind the intervention were liberal. What is further important to note is that with the help of 
the international community and more specifically North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) the war in Kosovo ended, this entailed that the ethnic cleansing of Albanians ended 
which obviously is protecting human rights but by putting an end to a war is just a shallow 
solution, the real challenges of human rights comes after the war and a lot of work and 
determination is needed for implementing and accepting human rights. The interesting part is 
therefore to investigate the situation in Kosovo after the NATO bombings. The issue of 
Kosovo will therefore give a clear vision if the international community works after the 
liberal standards and if they are working to keep their promises about human rights. The issue 
is not only protecting the Albanians, as they ended the war in favor of the Albanians, but to 
also help other minorities as Kosovo includes other ethnic groups as well. The question is 
therefore what happened to the rest of the population? The real issue in Kosovo is settling 
disputes between Albanians and other minorities, especially the Serb minority. How did the 
international community manage to solve the issues with the minorities in connection to 
human rights? It is also these statements that can let us evaluate the work of the international 
community and their credibility when it comes to working for democracy and human rights 
and evaluating how liberal the period after the intervention was but also how liberal the 
peacekeeping operation was. 
1.1 Aim 
The aim of this study is to investigate whether the work of the international community lived 
up to the promises made before and after the intervention in Kosovo in 1999. As the 
international community gave huge promises in Kosovo especially about human rights and 
minority rights it is interesting to investigate whether these promises were valid and most 
importantly if they were liberal as they claimed. The study will be carried out within the field 
of international relations, within this filed humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping 
operations are highly discussed. The aim is not to write about the intervention in Kosovo but 
what happened after the intervention. As it is common among scholars to argue that 
humanitarian interventions happen selectively the aim is to investigate whether this statement 
is true as the international community only put forward the liberal arguments about 
intervening. The interesting part is to understand if these liberal arguments really were lived 
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up to, if so, a conclusion can be drawn that humanitarian interventions and more important 
peacekeeping operations do not always happen selectively and really occur in the name of 
human rights. In order to carry out this study it is appropriate to carry out the thesis as a case 
study, basing most of the information on events that occurred during March 2004 in Kosovo. 
Not only will the study be a case study but also a theory applying study, where liberalism and 
realism will be applied on the case in order to understand whether the promises actually were 
liberal. In order to live up to the aim of the thesis it is important to take into consideration the 
work of the different international organizations that were present in Kosovo, but to also look 
at if human rights were implemented and respected in Kosovo. The aim is therefore to look at 
the chosen case; March 2004, through realism and liberalism.  
1.2 Problem formulation  
It might be true that humanitarian interventions happen selectively, but what is interesting is 
that the international community always argues that the reasons for intervening or carrying 
out peacekeeping operations are based on liberal ideas and on human rights. They further state 
that human rights should be on top of each agenda. Even if the arguments for intervening 
always are based on liberal ideas and have a special focus on individuals they have many 
times failed and not lived up to the mandate. Before intervening in Kosovo the international 
community gave huge promises about settling disputes and putting stop to human suffering. 
Obviously these arguments were liberal and in accordance with the theory of liberalism. It is 
therefore interesting to explore whether they managed to live up to what they promised. They 
were motivated when wanting to carry out the intervention; therefore it is interesting to look 
at whether this motivation and dedication was present even after the intervention as it is 
argued that humanitarian interventions are selectively chosen which actually means that 
realism is right about interventions. The appealing fraction is that the international community 
wanted to do no wrongs in Kosovo and gave liberal motives for an intervention. As a result it 
is interesting to look into the credibility of the arguments.  
The questions that will be answered during the thesis are; 
- How does the situation in Kosovo look like after the war and after the NATO 
intervention? 
- Did the international community live up to their liberal arguments/promises?  
- What kind of nature does the aftermath of the war in Kosovo develop into? Is it a 
liberal or a realist nature? 
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By trying to answer the questions, the purpose is to understand whether the intervention in 
Kosovo actually was based on liberalism or does the thesis take another path and show that 
realism is actually the bases for the intervention and the aftermath of the war.  
1.3 Method and material 
A study, like the one that I am conducting is commonly based on interviews and focus groups. 
A good research would be to make a field study. The information that would be gathered from 
a field study would probably be of value and would probably be a good method for carrying 
out the study. As there is no time and no possibility to make a field study and basing the thesis 
on participatory design and communication and ethnographic design my method for carrying 
out the thesis is limited. The information gathered is pending from important articles, books 
and resolutions that will hopefully lead to a good analysis and good conclusion. Much of the 
information will be gained from the organization Human Rights Watch as the organization is 
highly respected and has no reasons for changing information of events and situations in 
Kosovo, this further means that information gathered from this source is most probably true. I 
am aware of my problem formulation, and that the formulation is better suited when using 
participatory design. I still strongly believe that the information that I have been basing the 
thesis on have as much value and I believe that the outcome of the thesis will still be good 
even if the method is not ideal. What is further significant to note is that this thesis is a study 
that develops my bachelor thesis, much of the basis for this thesis is grounded on the 
conclusion of my previous thesis. As the thesis is conducted on a high educational level I take 
for granted that basic information about the international community, interventions and 
interventions linked to theories such as realism and liberalism are not a mystery. Basic 
information about these issues should be in the knowledge frame of any student within the 
field of social science and history.   
1.4 Limitations 
As mentioned earlier the thesis will be conducted within the field of international relations, by 
using two important theories. This also means that only the chosen theories will be regarded; 
no other theories will be included in the thesis. The reason for narrowing it down to realism 
and liberalism is because these two theories are the two most different ones but also the most 
common ones within international relations. Another limitation is that attention will only be 
drawn to one minority group in Kosovo; the Serbs. I am aware of the fact that there are other 
minorities present in Kosovo but the Serb minority is the one most affected by the events of 
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March in 2004. It is important to keep in mind that the thesis will not be dealing with 
humanitarian intervention; the intervention in Kosovo will only be mentioned as it is a part of 
the history. The intervention will only be referred to as the thesis want to explore what 
happened in Kosovo after this event. Therefore, the main topic for the thesis is to evaluate the 
work of the international community and if they lived up to their liberal notions concerning 
interventions. The third limitation is that focus will only be on organizations that were present 
in Kosovo. This means that the thesis is not looking at separate countries, governments or 
international leaders and how they responded to the situation in Kosovo. Further it is 
important to keep in mind that focal points will only be human rights and minority rights, 
other aspects and rights will not be looked at; the reason behind this is due to my own 
personal interest regarding the two chosen issues but also as these issues was most affected 
during the conflict in Kosovo.  
1.5 Outline 
The first chapter is based on an introduction of the thesis. This chapter will demonstrate what 
the aim, purpose, method, theory and case study will be the basis for the thesis. Further a short 
introduction to the problem will also be evaluated as well as the reason why I chose the topic I 
did. The second chapter will be dealing with the theory for the thesis. As the thesis will be 
conducted as a comparative and theory applying study the second chapter will point out 
important facts about the chosen theories; realism and liberalism. After this section a short 
connection will be made to the international community. The third chapter is what one would 
call a mixed chapter with a lot of valuable information in order to make the analysis and 
conclusion clearer. The third chapter gives and introduction to Kosovo’s history. This chapter 
will address the early history that lead up to the violence with the Serbs but also the history 
after the war and the intervention by NATO. The doctrine Responsibility to Protect will also 
be included in this chapter as well as discussions about peacekeeping. The section about 
peacekeeping will include questions as how peacekeeping works but also the positive and 
negative outcome of these missions. The lat section about peacekeeping operations will deal 
with the mission in Kosovo and how different organizations handled the issues in the region. 
These chapters are aiming to clarify and give a strong backbone to the analysis which is 
chapter four. The first couple of sections are dealing with Kosovo under international rule but 
also demonstrating which organizations and international forces were present in Kosovo 
during the time. This chapter will also discuss minorities in Kosovo and how they were 
affected by the situation and the international assistance. Lastly this chapter will also discuss 
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the riots in Kosovo which basically is the case study of this thesis. The fifth and the last 
chapter is the conclusion which aims to incorporate all the sections of the thesis and answer 
the questions that were displayed in the first chapter.  
2. Theory  
The diverse approaches in international relations that explain the relationship between states 
and other actors are designated theoretical perspectives. These theoretical perspectives are in 
focal point when international relations are studied. Realism and liberalism are the two 
perspectives that have huge immensity within the field. As the thesis is aiming to focus 
around issues that are related to international relations it is important to take theoretical 
perspectives into consideration. The thesis will take into account two perspectives; realism 
and liberalism, as these two traditions have a clear distinct idea about politics, interventions 
and especially about the function, work and the meaning of different organizations. The two 
chosen theories are very influential when discussing the international community and thus 
may have significant impact on whether the international community bases their work on 
liberal or realist ideas.  
2.1 Realism 
Realism is often considered to be the opposite of liberalism. This theory is usually apparent as 
the most dominant theory in international relations, in the 1930 - and 1940's, E. H Carr 
and Hans J. Morgenthau had great influence in international relations. They emphasized the 
unlimited power; the state could and should always seek for more power. They further 
considered politics to be a competition between states. Since the beginning of the Second 
World War, policymakers and different leaders have seen world politics from a 
realistic perspective (Dunne & Schmidt 2005: 161-162).  The slogan for the theory reads as 
follows;”the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to 
accept “. This statement shows that states are constantly competing with each other in order to 
achieve power, as power is a synonym to survival (Dunne & Schmidt 2005: 169). The state, 
which is considered to be the leading actor within the theory, must constantly seek for more 
power. It is thus the leader's duty to act wisely and reasonable and undertake missions and 
means that ensures the state's survival. This means that realists are skeptic to principles 
about universal moral (Dunne & Schmidt 2005: 162-163). This plainly states that actions that 
a state implements are not directed by moral principles and moral obligations, but are carried 
out for the sake of national interests, power and security (Donnelly 2005: 48). Realism is 
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usually regarded as an egoistic theory in which the individual does not obtain the utmost 
priority (Burchill 2005: 68). Realism puts high value on sovereignty, state sovereignty is 
absolute which means that the state has the highest authority to implement laws (Dunne & 
Schmidt 2005: 172). Although the respect for state sovereignty is huge does not imply that 
realism utterly abandon interventions. The realist view on interventions is divided into two 
categories; legal interventions and political interventions. The legal category deals with 
issues such as national sovereignty and the non-intervention principle. No actors outside the 
state, let it be organizations or other states, are not allowed to interfere in another 
state's internal affairs as every state has the right to control and govern within its borders. If 
this statement is not respected it would imply that sovereignty is being violated. The 
political category is based on typical realistic argument, this category means that states 
implement a foreign policy that protects and promotes the national interests. When 
these interests are at stake an intervention is carried out and will not seek out to justify the 
action. Further the intervention requires no humanitarian arguments as it is the duty of every 
state to promote interests. If interests are not involved, a state will not impose an intervention. 
Risking the lives of soldiers, resources and relationships with governments is not 
practical when national interests are satisfied (Hoffmann 2006: 669-670). States do not 
intervene in the name of human rights; they intervene as they have something to gain or 
because national interests would be pleased (Glanville 2006: 154). As previously mentioned, 
states do not coordinate actions in order to fulfill moral obligations, as morality does not exist 
among states and therefore there is no moral obligation to intervene in areas where such 
action would be needed. There is no moral obligation to send people and soldiers to troubled 
areas. The soldiers do not have a moral obligation to risk their lives for the 
suffering humanity as realism argues that citizens alone are answerable for their state. As a 
civil authority breaks down or is behaving in a harsh way towards its citizens, as to 
violate their rights, the responsibility lies in the hand of the own political leaders and 
citizens. Outsiders have no moral obligation to intervene, even if they could improve the 
situation in the country. Realism suggests that humanitarian intervention is 
implemented selectively; selectivity wheels the choice to 
intervene or not intervene (Wheeler& Bellamy 2005: 558-559). This means that the human 
values are affected and improved in states that are in conflict only welfare of the powerful is 
guaranteed (Belloni 2006: 330). If there are benefits involved in implementing an 
intervention then the campaign will be carried out, but this does not mean 
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that intervention will take place in all comparable or related areas as realism is not supported 
on morality. 
2.1.1 Realism and the international community 
It is no longer a secret that when the international community, and maybe also individual 
states have an interest in mind they might agree on an operation. But what is interesting is that 
for an intervention or a peacekeeping mission to be successful it is important that interests are 
engaged, as interests can motivate actors do fulfill the mission but it is not good when 
interests are the focus point as operations will then only concentrate on interests and human 
rights will be left aside (Fortna 2008: 19). Luca Ratti, a very influential scholar in the field of 
international relations states that the international community and more specific NATO is not 
a traditional alliance, NATO is more considered to be a political community that is build 
around American notions. This political community constructs the national interests of the 
member countries and particularly the interests of the United States. What is further important 
to cite is that realism points out that the international community is a rational actor, most 
notable in economics, where the intention of action is maximization of utility. The central 
statement of the realist research model is that the international system is anarchic. The only 
way for the world to function is when states only look after themselves and do everything in 
their power to gain more power and control. States are rational actors and are therefore 
obliged to pursue offensive strategies in their search for security. Ratti further points out that 
NATO legitimize the American influence and power, the Unites States is ready to act without 
the approval of its allies when leaders distinguish that American strategic and foreign policy 
interests command it (Ratti 2006: 81-84). The members within the alliance have many times 
not agreed on how to handle situations, examples are the war in Kosovo, Afghanistan and 
Iraq. The United States followed their own interests and did not take into account what the 
other states suggested. This means that in the end states are egoistic and strive to fulfill own 
interests and act in a way that will benefit them no matter if they over through rules and laws. 
Ratti further points out that NATO, this highly respected alliance, have many times ignored 
new members as their entrance in NATO would not be valuable for the United States (Ratti 
2006: 89). If states would not strive to fulfill their interests the world would be a strange 
place. States are the most important actors and actors such as organizations will in the end not 
make a difference in politics. There is nothing that is or can be more powerful than the state; 
even if realism has a skeptic view towards organizations they do not deny their existence. In 
this matter realism is the complete opposite to liberalism as they believe that it is important 
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for world politics to have international organizations and institutions. Realism simply means 
that states share the view that institutions are a tool of national governments and the states use 
them in ways that suit their national interests. Institutions are influenced by interests of its 
member states and more specifically by those that are considered to be the most powerful 
ones (Ratti 2006: 97-99). A very good example that the realist theory points out is the case of 
Kosovo, the theory demonstrates that actors do what they want when interests and power is 
involved. The intervention in Kosovo showed that NATO with the lead from the United States 
had no authorization from UN’s Security Council, it was not even required as the United 
States were convinced that Russia and China would veto the proposal. Lastly, realists mean 
that peacekeeping enables involved states to increase their international power (Pugh 2004: 
49- 51). 
2.2 Liberalism 
It is often argued that realism is the most dominant theory within international relations. 
Despite this, even liberalism has been very influential. Since the origins of liberalism, the 
1700s, the liberal ideas have formed our thinking about the associations between 
governments and individuals. More recently the liberal ideas have also shaped our thoughts 
about the relationship between organization and states, but also organizations and individuals 
(Dunne 2005: 186 & 188).Especially during the 1900s policy makers from the West were 
influenced by the liberal ideas. Liberalism reached its peak with great inspiration in Europe 
and North America after the fall of communism in the Soviet Union. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union showed that liberalism would be the most dominant theory in international 
relations. Liberalism was the ideal theory which would typify and dominate the field of 
international relations. The individuals’ central role is one of the most important 
characteristics of the liberal theory. People all over the world have rights to political freedom, 
democracy, guaranteed basic human rights and equality before the law (Burchill 2005: 55-56). 
As the liberal theory addresses the people it is important to note that ethical principals are 
very valuable. Within the liberal theory, there are different insights regarding issues with 
humanitarian intervention. The dilemma lies in whether to intervene because of ethical 
principles to protect human rights, or whether to not intervene as it violates sovereignty. It 
is often argued that ethical standards should surpass and give reason for an intervention in 
another state’s interior affairs (Burchill 2005: 69). Many debates have also shown that the 
arguments that suggest that humanitarian intervention is not in accordance with state 
sovereignty is not valid, this because sovereignty has taken another path when globalization 
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and international cooperation were introduced (Burchill 2005: 82). Liberalism is regarded to 
be a “moral theory” which means that states have both a legal right and a moral duty 
to intervene in areas where the population is affected to violence. Liberalism is not only 
associated with morality, peculiar to this theory is also the human rights approach. As 
mentioned earlier, the basis for the theory is that the individual and human rights should be 
considered with huge respect (Wheeler & Bellamy 2005: 559). Further the theory emphasizes 
that there is a humanitarian obligation to stop or reduce human agony. Actors such as states or 
organizations intervene within the boundaries of other states only to protect human rights, 
eliminate genocide and ethnic cleansing (Hoffmann 2006: 668). Crucial to the theory is 
that human rights should have a high position on UN’s agenda. When the UN fails 
to solve large scale problems such as genocide and mass murder, the individual states have a 
proper and just obligation to intervene in these problematic areas to reduce human suffering  
(Wheeler & Bellamy 2005: 560).  
2.2.1 Liberalism and the international community 
In the previous section it is already mentioned that it is common that missions are carried out 
as there are interests engaged. What is further important to note is that liberalism wants to 
influent other countries with democracy and liberal thoughts. The liberal theory cannot deny 
that interests are involved in different mission, but what is different from the realist approach 
is that interest are not only egoistic, not only benefitting the actor, but benefitting the state that 
is being intervened as well. The international community then argues that there is not a 
question about selectively, but as there is a chance to spread liberal thoughts and democracy 
interventions should be carried out in those regions that have chances for improvement  and 
where the chances for success are high (Fortna 2008: 19). Not all scholars are in accordance 
with each other when it comes to these statements, many argue that UN avoids to intervene in 
regions that are considered to be useless for them, they avoid to intervene in places that 
demand a lot of resources and they also avoid to intervene in military powerful countries, as 
their chances for success are low. This therefore means that debates show different opinion on 
what kind of missions UN carries out (Fortna 2008: 20). Either way, the international 
community has a liberal statement and argumentation for reacting the way that they do and 
their work is simply based on liberal notions. Liberal theories of international relations 
suggest that peace is ordinary among states with liberal systems. The theory claims that actors 
and most commonly states interests can be chased and fulfilled via international co-operation 
rather than via conflict. States are dedicated to peace and stability when they enjoy political 
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lawfulness. What is further appealing is that the liberal approach demonstrates that 
democracies do not fight each other. When they share the same politics they will form some 
kind of unification to one and other and understand that it is more beneficial to co-operate and 
stay on good terms. The theory suggests that international institutions play a huge role in 
international politics. International institutions have a capability to impact state policies. 
International institutions tend to establish a “regime” that charts a set of implicit and explicit 
principles, norms and rules. Institutions can affect the preferences and policies of actors; they 
also reduce anarchy in the international system and make the viewpoint of war less probable 
(Ratti 2006: 86-87). The international community and international systems are supporters of 
peace, a liberal peace that can be spread to all corners of the world. They further believe that 
through peacekeeping operations it is possible to reach liberal markets, welfare in economics 
and global governance (Pugh 2004: 41). The international community further wants the poor 
and less developed countries to be a part of globalization, this notion goes under programs 
and notions to develop less civilized countries in order to make the whole world part of 
globalization, the reason behind this is due to the moral obligation that states possess when it 
comes to helping other societies in need (Pugh 2004: 46-51).  
3. History 
This chapter aims to describe the history in Kosovo with a focus on the involvement and 
disputes with the Serbs. History is usually described as something time evolving. Event after 
event are linked together and describes an outcome. This statement is perceptibly true, but it is 
also important to keep in mind that history is complex. When discussing Kosovo’s and 
Balkan’s history it important to note that the situation has for a very long time been very 
complicated. This chapter will firstly try to explain why Albanians and Serbs are foes to 
further explain some events that strengthen the statement that they see each other as enemies. 
The later section will investigate what happened in Kosovo after the main events that history 
exposed.  
  3.1 Kosovo’s history 
The disputes between Kosovo and Serbia go long back. The history of Kosovo is seen as a 
battlefield between Albanians and Serbs. The main reason for the conflict between these two 
parts has to do with the disagreement of who was first in Kosovo. The Albanians give a 
different set of events that lead up to understanding that they were first in Kosovo and the 
same goes for the Serbs as they offer a set of events that lead up to a conclusion that they 
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were first in Kosovo (Judah 2008: 30). The Albanians state that they were in Kosovo first as 
Illyrians and Dardanians, therefore the land is theirs. The Slavs invaded their country and has 
therefore no right to ownership of Kosovo. The Serbs on the other hand state that there might 
have been some Albanians in Kosovo during the Middle Ages but the majority of the 
population was Serbs and Kosovo was the hart and the most valuable part of their kingdom. 
The migration of Albanians from Albania to Kosovo came after the arrival of the Ottomans. 
The main arguments from the Serbs that Kosovo belongs to them is that the origin from the 
name Kosovo has roots in the Serbian language and comes from the word “Kos” which is a 
synonym to blackbird, therefore many Serbs argue that it would be a false statement to argue 
that the Albanians were there first. The fact is that no Albanians have tried to confirm that 
Kosovo has Albanian roots they claim that the name of the state is “Dardania” after the early 
Illyrian people that lived in Kosovo during ancient times. The next argument that the Serbs 
emphasize is that there are many Slavic churches in Kosovo, which should be considered a 
proof that the Serbs were there first because Albanians have no churches as they claim to be 
Muslims. The Albanians on the other hand never argued that they have ancestry in Islam, 
instead they emphasize that they were Christians and were part of Western civilization. They 
further state that their churches were taken over and designed and changed into Orthodox 
ones by the invading Serbs (Judah 2008: 18-19 & 31). The most important event in the history 
between these two groups is “Battle of Kosovo”. Kosovo was a place considered to be a 
battlefield where Slavs and Albanians fought the Ottomans. The Serbs claim that their Hero 
was Lazar, later named Tsar Lazar who was the main hero during the battle with the 
Ottomans, and the Serbs built their state on two pillars: the medieval state and the churches. 
When the state was destroyed by the Ottomans, the churches continued to exist. The second 
element is the role played by Serbian epic poems as stories of the heroic past were conserved 
in song (Judah 2008: 20-21). On the contrary, just as Lazar offer the historical support for 
Serbian history, Skanderbeg has come to do the same for the Albanians. He was a medieval 
hero but also the main hero in the Albanian history. He was born as Gjergj Kastriot but was 
abducted by the Ottomans and sent to Istanbul as a hostage. In Istanbul he was converted to 
Islam and fought together with the Sultan and took the name Skanderbeg. But after his return 
he fought beside his Albanians against the Turks and converted back to Christianity and 
liberated huge parts of today’s Albania (Judah 2008: 25). Since then disputes between the 
Albanians and Serbs have been present. The years between 1878 and 1912 are known as the 
end of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. In 1912, during November Albania was declared 
independent. But Kosovo’s status was still unsettled, by the end of 1912 Serbia had taken 
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much of Kosovo, Montenegro was also in possession of Pec, Decan and Djakovica (Great 
cities in Kosovo). Other parts of Kosovo were taken by the Macedonians, Bulgarians and 
Greeks. There were obviously Albanians in revolt but as Serbia, Montenegro and Greece all 
had armies to organize, unlike the Albanians they were unable to fight in Kosovo. From the 
beginning of the First World War until 1918 Kosovo lied in the hands of the Serbs. In 1918 a 
new Kingdom was created which was dominated by Serbia; the new state took in Croatia, 
Dalmatia, Vojvodina, Slovenia, Montenegro, Bosnia –Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia 
under the name Yugoslavia. During the Second World War most of Kosovo was made part of 
Albania but was controlled by Italy (Judah 2008: 37-41). When Tito came to power after the 
war he formed the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Tito struggled to go 
beyond ethnicity through underlining socialist unity. One of the products of this tactic to state 
building was to lower ethnic tension in wars. During Tito’s time as a leader most parts of 
Yugoslavia was satisfied including the Albanians (Higate & Henry 2009: 31). It is still 
important to mention that Albanians had very little power over themselves but in time more 
and more power was given to them to arrange the province. In 1974 almost full autonomy was 
given to Kosovo but the region was still under the rule of Serbia. Following the death of Tito 
in 1980, the authorities in Pristina had large degree of independence and in 1981the Albanians 
demonstrated as they demanded that Kosovo become a full republic (Judah 2008: 37-41). In 
1981 student riots took place in the University of Pristina, as Albanians were facing 
discrimination in finding work that they were equally qualified to perform. These riots drove 
nationalist beliefs and the relations between Albanians and Serbs never improved. However, 
since 1987, Slobodan Milosevic gained popularity; he brought a new way of thinking which 
was mostly based on nationalism. He rapidly developed a rhetoric that was based on historical 
claims and a unification of Serbia. In his statements he also included Kosovo, as to him 
Kosovo was a part of Serbia (Higate & Henry 2009: 31-32). As Milosevic gained power 
Kosovo went under the control of Serbia and more specific under direct control of the 
government in Belgrade. The Albanians were denied rights to govern themselves but also 
legal systems and education in their own language. This means that the situation for the 
Albanians became very complicated and harsh. The situation could easily accelerate into 
ethnic violence with abuse of human rights and defeat of democracy. Following, the 
Albanians struggled to cope with this situation by peaceful means. They formed their own 
government in order to secure the Albanians with rights and legal justice as many of them 
were denied by the authorities in Belgrade. The relationship between the two ethnic groups 
only got worse, Albanians were very frustrated over the situation as the Serbian elite and 
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government were treating them unfair, simply continuing to repress them. These harsh 
relationships soon developed into an unfriendly atmosphere which would make a war 
inevitable. The predictable war started on February 28, 1998 with an attack by Serbian police 
in the towns of Likosane and Cirez in Drenica leaving twenty-five ethnic Albanians dead. In 
addition to this, until the end of war in 1999, just about 1 million people were displaced, more 
than 10 thousand were killed, many were tortured and many saw their property shattered. The 
situation in Kosovo attracted attention from the international community. They were 
concerned about the human rights violation and its potential to spread instability to nearby 
countries in the region. Following these circumstances and failure of diplomacy the situation 
resulted in ineffective dialogues to solve the problem in the region with peaceful means. 
Unfortunately the only way to put an end to the war was by letting NATO intervene. 
Regarding the Kosovo crisis, all means were used in order to reach a peaceful settlement. The 
international community was constantly trying to settle the situation with dialogues and 
agreements but everything seemed to be useless thus the use of armed forces. As it seems the 
international community gave plenty of opportunities to the Serbs in order to negotiate, but as 
the international community argued that human rights and international morality was put to 
the test therefore they had no other solution but to intervene.  NATO’s efforts in March 1999 
wanted to reach an agreement between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Serbs, but 
as the Albanians were demanding independence the Serbs denied all proposals. The situation 
was everything else but stable, something needed to be done. The United States believed that 
Milosevic and his army would give up but they continued their fight against Kosovo, instead 
Milosevic gave orders to accelerate the ethnic cleansing and more troops were send to Kosovo 
(Saariluoma 2004: 63-70) .The situation in Kosovo got accordingly out of hand that even 
more Albanians were forced to leave. It became apparent that Milosevic was not frightened by 
NATO’s threats. As the leaders did not want to put at risk NATO’s credibility the only 
solution was to instigate a bombing campaign. The NATO campaign was incorporated in 
1999, during March and ended about three months later. On the same date the United Nations 
Security Council passed Resolution 1244 that demanded withdrawal of military, police but 
also a deployment of an international civil and security attendance in Kosovo. The Serb 
withdrawal was complete a couple of days later and Kosovo Force (KFOR) was established in 
Kosovo, followed by  a United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). What is important to 
note is that one cannot state that the ending of the war was only an American implementation, 
as 19 states in NATO approved the agreement. It was without a doubt also a European 
contribution. Simply speaking the intervention was an American initiative with an input from 
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other states and actors. The 11-week bombing campaign was the first armed force by NATO 
in its 50-year existence. The Kosovo crises was unique in more than one way as the Security 
Council did not agree on the intervention as two of the five member states; Russia and China 
made it clear that they would veto all proposals connected to a military action in Kosovo. In 
this regard, the Kosovo case was considered as a test to the international community 
particularly to UN, NATO and European Union (EU). This framework also tested the capacity 
of NATO and the EU to maintain the military and diplomatic partnerships (Minear, Barda & 
Sommers 2000: 4-8). The intervention did put an end to the war but it is important to 
recognize that the international organizations did not have an easy time in Kosovo, the 
organization constantly faced demonstrations from the locals, especially from anti-Serb and 
anti-UN groups (Higate & Henry 2009: 32). 
 3.2 The latter history of Kosovo   
After the intervention the situation in Kosovo got better but far away from good. Riots and 
disputes were still present in the region. Even if the region was characterized with peace 
among the two ethnic groups, violations of human rights were in attendance. Maintaining 
peace after a civil conflict presents many challenges, as enemies have to disarm, agree on a 
government, agree on a unified army and live alongside each other. This account shows that 
Kosovo was facing huge challenges and was in desperate need of a well functioning 
peacekeeping operation (Fortna 2008: 4). What is essential to note in this section is that 
problems in the city of Mitrovica are still present. The city is a good example that shows that 
isolation, hostility and fear continue to haunt the people. The city is split by ethnicity, the 
north city is populated by Serbs and the southern part of Mitrovica is populated by Albanians. 
The separated city represents the lack of communication, security and integration in Kosovo 
(Higate & Henry 2009: 33). The latter history of Kosovo implies that the region was not able 
to face these challenges but needed guidance from international forces. As the international 
community has argued that it is their responsibility to protect people that are being denied 
rights it is more than right that forces should overlook the situation in Kosovo. 
3.3 Responsibility to Protect 
 The ideas about protecting and promoting human rights do not always 
agree with diplomatic principles, especially the most important principles in the 
Westphalian world order based on sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs of 
states. When the UN first was founded, the organization emphasized the non-
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intervention principle as UN wanted this principle to be respected (Belloni 2006: 329 & 
Grono 2006: 622). As the non-intervention principle has been very influential in international 
politics it is understandable that notions about protecting and implementing human rights can 
be a challenge. However after the genocide in Rwanda, the international community promised 
that such tragic events would not be repeated again. The international community realized the 
importance of acting with the correct response when human rights 
violation occurs (Belloni 2006: 328). The ideas about the protection and establishment 
of human rights in the international community have grown stronger, while the concept 
of sovereignty has changed focus and turned towards  responsibility to protect human rights 
and citizens in need. The key reason for this change and is the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report on the Responsibility to Protect 
(Pattison 2008: 262). This doctrine has since 2001 become progressively more influential and 
is now universally accepted as it provides criterion for international response to conflict 
(Grono 2006: 621- 622). The report emphasizes that the notion behind sovereignty as control 
(each state has the liberty to choose how to treat citizens) should be changed into sovereignty 
as responsibility (each state has the responsibility to provide human rights to the population) 
(Pattison 2007: 262). This further means that each state should accept the duties of providing 
and protecting human rights. A state can not only cherish those benefits that sovereignty 
entails but has to look at the responsibilities that follow as well; respecting and accepting 
human rights but also protecting the welfare of the people  (Linter 2005: 274). Further the 
state is not only responsible towards its own residents but also towards the international 
community (Williams & Bellamy 2005: 28). Each state has the primary responsibility for its 
people but when the state is unable or unwilling to protect and serve the people with human 
rights, the responsibility is transferred to the international community. Such transfer usually 
occurs during genocide, mass murder and ethnic cleansing but also when human rights are not 
respected. This means that the international community must act in ways that 
guarantee rights to the population (Grono 2006: 623 & Pattison 2008: 262). R2P was 
additionally an important factor that drove the intervention in Kosovo. Decision-makers 
constantly pointed towards the doctrine and argued that it is an obligation to introduce an 
intervention in Kosovo. 
The very liberal doctrine is very well formulated on paper but unfortunately doctrines can be 
misused or not respected to the fullest which means that the doctrine can be exposed to abuse. 
The reason behind the abuse is due to the difficulty to determine whether an intervention is a 
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genuine intervention or an abuse of the doctrine Responsibility to Protect (Bellamy 2006: 
148). An abuse of the doctrine implies that the main ideas of the doctrine are not respected. 
States or other actors do not put enough resources into solving the problem within an agreed 
area. The international community has many times argued that a conflict is an internal 
problem and should be solved by the own government, it is not the responsibility of other 
actors from outside the region to get involved. This further means that the international 
community is ignoring the responsibilities that the doctrine has put upon them, which they 
have accepted when the doctrine was formulated (Bellamy 2006: 148). The doctrine can 
further be bent in any course in term to benefit actors. If actors do not have any interest in 
solving a conflict within a region they will not put resources into the region and will argue 
that an intervention is optional. On the other hand, if interests are involved the international 
community will fight for their right to intervene in a region. By choosing which places or 
conflicts to try to settle is choosing selectively which humans are more important than others, 
this is strictly against the doctrine as it is a duty and obligation to react when human rights are 
violated. By choosing conflicts selectively implies that the doctrine is not living up to the 
liberal statements (Bellamy 2006: 148 & Pattison 2008: 269). The issue of Kosovo is 
therefore very complicated as debates show mixed opinion on whether the intervention in 
Kosovo was a genuine intervention or if it was an abuse of the doctrine R2P. In order to reach 
a clear opinion about this matter it is vital to look at the peacekeeping operation that was send 
to Kosovo after the intervention by NATO. If the operation showed huge success it should be 
considered as a genuine intervention as the actors involved were motivated to make progress 
in Kosovo. But it the operation failed it means that the doctrine was abused and that the 
intervention in Kosovo was based on interests and has a realist nature. 
3.4 Peacekeeping operations 
The term peacekeeping goes often under the definition; “a multinational force, sometimes 
with a civilian element, mandated to administer, monitor or patrol in conflict areas in a natural 
and imperial way, usually with the consent of the parties to a dispute, and nearly always under 
the provisions of Chapter VI of the UN Charter (sometimes under the enforcement provisions 
of Chapter VII)” (Pugh 2004: 47). Another explanation is; “Peacekeeping refer to the 
deployment of international personnel to help maintain peace and security in the aftermath of 
war. All peacekeeping missions involve military personnel, though they may not be armed, 
and many missions include substantial civilian components as well” (Fortna 2008: 5). 
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A peacekeeping operation revolves around soldiers of freedom that can be sent from zones of 
peace to zones of disorder and criminality in order to win conflicts against strong 
governments. The main disputes within this framework arise over whether state interests will 
be fulfilled by engaging in particular interventions. Many debates about peacekeeping evolve 
around the state sovereignty and how an intervention is not in accordance with the Westphalia 
state model (Pugh 2004: 40-41). When UN first was recognized in 1945 there was no 
discussions about peacekeeping operations, but as the world witnessed that people are in need 
of military personnel in order to solve disputes and protect human rights peacekeeping 
operations were introduced. These operations were therefore developed after the Cold War 
years. Peacekeeping operations have evolved over time and are to be seen as “new military 
humanism”. The aim is to promote human security and human rights with a right to use force. 
The operations are not only using military force to change harsh situations but the operations 
have a couple of more tasks such as; protecting civilians from abuse, organizing elections, 
assisting the growth of new political structures, disarming armies and introducing 
circumstances for lasting peace (Higate & Henry 2009: 43-45). Maintaining peace after a war 
is a very difficult task and a serious problem, but this does not mean that it is impossible. 
Peacekeeping operations most often have a positive contribution to regions characterized by 
war and conflict. This would imply that peacekeeping operations work and should be 
treasured. Peacekeeping operations offer a set of tools that can be introduced by the 
international community in order to reduce the risk of another war. Obviously when 
discussing peacekeeping operations it is also important to discuss sovereignty, as an operation 
entails interference in one countries sovereignty. Many times international policy makers have 
made the choice to not send peacekeepers to a region as they believe that the region is not 
worth the cost. Obviously the statement is very harsh as the operations many times have had a 
positive outcome as they have been proven to be an effective tool for maintaining peace 
(Fortna 2008: 179). Many times conflicts have been in desperate need of assistance and help 
and the peacekeeping operations were the only resources that could reduce the human 
suffering and give locals hope for future peace. This means that when all other options 
showed no success the international community turns to the peacekeeping missions in order to 
improve situations (Higate & Henry 2009: 1). But what also is important to address is that 
there are a lot of problems with peacekeeping, many times they are improvised, planned at the 
last minute, understaffed and underequipped. The international community is aware that there 
is a conflict going on and feel obligated to react but does not have enough will to do so, 
therefore they are often not really thought through (Fortna 2008: 76). This further means that 
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many politicians agree on the fact that the international community sends peacekeepers to 
places where there is a political will for peace and where the chances for reaching peace are 
high (Fortna 2008: 3). This statement is without a doubt unfair but seems to be the only 
solution as the international community wants to reach success and that can only be done by 
taking on conflicts that seem to have a solution and chance for peace. As the international 
community can choose selectively where to send operations it is interesting to investigate how 
the international community argues when sending their forces to a region. Many times they 
declare that it is important to send missions to places where there is a chance for success other 
times they argue that it is more important to send peacekeepers to places where the chance for 
peace is smaller and the region is in need for more qualified help (Fortna 2008: 25). It is 
further important to point out that interests of the great powers are involved. The great powers 
may decide to send peacekeeping forces to a region due to their close relations, political and 
historical interests, alliance ties and strategic resources. If the powers have something to gain 
from the region the chances for intervening and sending peacekeeping forces to the place is 
believed to be higher (Fortna 2008: 33). Important to note is that there are theories and views 
that are cynical to these statements; there is not a model involving interests that the 
international community follows in order to decide where to send peacekeeping forces. The 
decisions are most commonly based on verdicts that the UN believes is the best for the region 
but also for the world safety and world peace. The international community has motives such 
as democracy, international peace and stability. These factors are factors that decide whether a 
region is in need of peacekeeping forces or not. If a civil war threatens the world peace then it 
is more likely that a peacekeeping operation is carried out. The more deadly a war is the more 
probable a peacekeeping operation is. Democracy is further an important reason for 
operations, if there is no democracy whatsoever in a region the chances for sending 
peacekeeping operations are higher (Fortna 2008: 34-35).The question of neocolonialism is 
also present when making decisions about peacekeeping operations. The international 
community can once again be in doubt as they do not want their mission to be linked to 
neocolonialism. The economical status of the region can also be a factor that determines 
peacekeeping operations. If a region is very poor the chances for sustainable peace is less 
likely, many therefore argue that it is more common to send operations to places where the 
economic status is better. These statements and factors simply imply that there is not a strict 
schedule or a model that the international community follow based on interests or 
humanitarian crises in order to decide where to send peacekeeping operations (Fortna 2008: 
41-45).  
 
 
21 
 
For an operation to be successful it is important that there is cooperation between the two 
parties; the peacekeepers and the exposed people in the region. When a peacekeeping team is 
present it is easier to embrace peace but it is also important that there is communication 
between the different parties. When discussing civil war it is important to also have a 
common goal between the different parties within the region. They have to have the same 
goal in order for an operation to be successful, the goal and the aim should clearly be peace 
(Fortna 2008: 79-81).But it is important to address that a state cannot expect the whole work 
to be carried out by the outer forces and actors. If there is no common interest by the parties 
involved it is common that war will break out again. In order for a peacekeeping operation to 
be successful much depends on how the parties involved in the conflict react. Even if they 
agree on peace and welcome the peacekeeping operation war can start up again, this if 
mistrust and fear is in attendance. They know that the other party immediately can start up a 
conflict that can burst into a new war. An atmosphere that is based on mistrust is constantly 
present, but also the feelings of mistrust and security dilemma are regularly present. Even if a 
peace agreement is reached about disarmament and demobilization, the foes often hold some 
forces in store in order to be safe if they would be attacked. The security dilemma is therefore 
very hard to get away from. The atmosphere is often characterized with defensive purposes, 
which mean that the agreements are not followed, if one party knows that the other one has 
forces left, they will want to regain arm in order to be safe if an attack transpires. Acting in 
this way will most commonly feed mistrust. Hopefully peacekeeping actions can result in 
peace, but in worst case they will escalate into war (Fortna 2008: 82-84). Accidents or 
incidents between soldiers or civilians can also escalate into war, continuing fighting’s are a 
sign that the situation will culminate and burst into war. Political segregation is further a 
common reason for a situation to escalate into further fighting’s or even war. States can and 
often do agree to live with their differences in the aftermath of war, but ending domestic war 
necessitates a governance structure that both sides can endure. In order for an operation to 
work and to be successful it is undoubtedly important that the peacekeepers help with sorting 
out the factors mentioned above. They can many times dislocate spirals of fear and security 
dilemma by tumbling insecurity about each other’s intentions. They can prevent accidents 
from occurring or control them so they do not escalate to war (Fortna 2008: 85-86). Various 
times when peacekeepers are present in a region they lower the mistrust between the parties, 
this is controllable as they are present and have the resources to do so. Their presence simply 
has a “calming effect” (Fortna 2008: 89 & 96). But once again the whole burden does not fall 
on the UN and the peacekeeping forces, it is important to notice that for an operation to be 
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successful it is vital that the natives also have a positive and helpful attitude (Fortna 2008: 
90). The most common missions that the peacekeepers have are; monitoring elections, 
reforming institutions of law, monitoring human rights and rebuilding state institutions. This 
simply means that they are obliged to move the conflict from the combat zone to institutions 
(Fortna 2008: 98-99). In order for peace to be sustainable peace have to occur in the region 
after the peacekeepers leave (Fortna 2008: 111). Unfortunately this is not always the case, one 
example is Kosovo. As the international community is still present in Kosovo it is very 
difficult to judge if the peace in the region is sustainable.  What further can settle if a 
peacekeeping operation is successful is depending on what kind of war was stirring; if the war 
was based on ethnic conflict it is obvious that it is harder to settle disputes between parties. 
The same thing goes when a war is based on identity. These conflicts often have complicated 
roots and cannot be fixed easily. Experts argue here that it is therefore important to introduce 
democracy, when democracy is working it is easier to settle disputes (Fortna 2008: 117). As 
mentioned earlier the most important task is to introduce peace and to make people in the 
troubled region safe. The only way to succeed with this task is to make peace more popular 
and pleasant than war. Peacekeepers also have to make locals aware that war does not bring 
them any advantages as they will only spend resources, money and lives of soldiers and 
civilians. In order to do that it is important for peacekeepers to stop the fear among people and 
decrease ambiguity that lead to security dilemmas. The peacekeepers also have to be alert and 
reduce the risk for accidents as accidents tend to spiral into war. In order to maintain all these 
tasks it is crucial to make locals believe and trust the peacekeepers but also believe that they 
are treated equally. When people feel that they are respected and treated in a fair way they 
will not feel a need to fight (Fortna 2008: 127). Lastly to end this section it is important to 
once again mention the peacekeepers cannot make all the changes themselves, in order for an 
operation to be successful the parties that fought in the war need to cooperate with each other 
but also with the peacekeepers. Something very important to point out is that the international 
community constantly pressures peacekeepers to introduce democracy, as democracy is a 
good tool for settling disputes, but once again peacekeepers cannot solve the entire situation, 
dedication from the people is needed as well (Fortna 2008: 172-174). 
3.5 Peacekeeping – negative response 
International leaders were committed to make changes when it came to peacekeeping, they 
were aware that more effective means and dedication was appropriate. The world was 
suffering enough and the international community needed to do something about the problem. 
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Unfortunately it is harder than it sounds to change the nature of peacekeeping operations; the 
reason behind this is due to the mixed opinions about peacekeeping missions. Critics mean 
that it is unfair to choose regions and conflicts selectively. If the international community 
wants to fight for human rights than all rights, over the whole world should have the same 
treatment and value. Many times operations are also linked to neo-colonialism and are seen as 
mediums for global governance (Higate & Henry 2009: 9). In order for missions to be 
successful it is important that the international community agree on what should be done and 
how to accomplish tasks. Unfortunately this is not how it always looks like, as actors many 
times have different opinions on how to solve situations in shattered regions. When 
undertaking tasks such as peacekeeping operations it is common that critics argue that it is a 
form of global governance, but not positive global governance as the actors are seeking for 
gaining more power and “telling the weaker” how they should behave and govern their state. 
Many critics also comment on peacekeeping operations as it is a form of globalization, once 
again not positive globalization, as it aims to spread notions of what a state should look like 
and how it should act (Higate & Henry 2009: 10-11). Even if the goal is to promote 
democracy, human rights and justice it has numerous times had a negative effect. Introducing 
political and economic liberalization has engendered negative effects in troubled states, 
hindering peace and leading to new fighting’s. Spreading the ideas of liberal peace and 
believes that democratic states are a good model for a state develops feelings of having a 
core-periphery relation or an “us vs. them” relation. As the United States have huge power in 
the UN it is common that their hegemony comes to the surface. Critics argue that the United 
States is trying to change policies in the UN in order to benefit them. Due to their power in 
international politics conflict devastated regions tend to think that ideas are being forced upon 
them from the West and more importantly the United States. This was the case in Kosovo, 
even if two countries out of the five permanent members in the Security Council wanted to 
veto the proposal of an intervention in Kosovo the United States still carried out their mission 
(Higate & Henry 2009: 12-13). It is therefore, unfortunately, believed that the liberal peace 
that the international community is trying to spread only is a tactic in order to rationalize 
interventions and meddling in other countries domestic politics. Therefore critics draw the 
conclusion that peacekeeping operations are based on interests from the powerful that agree 
on sending peacekeeping missions to a region. To sum it up, it is argued that today´s 
peacekeeping operations replicate a new balance of power in the post-Cold War politics 
(Higate & Henry 2009: 15). Lastly, the UN is known for working for democracy and human 
rights, but critics mean that great powers many times use this in order to satisfy their own 
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interest in regions (Higate & Henry 2009: 46). When looking at interests and not really trying 
to settle the disputes in the shattered region the outcome might be that bigger problems occur 
and affect more people around the world as migration flows will obviously be high and 
insecurity will spread all over (Pugh 2004: 45-46). 
3.6 Peacekeeping in Kosovo 
As already established the aim of UN and NATO had good intentions, but the outcome lead to 
a harden separation between Serbs and Albanians (Higate & Henry 2009: 59). People in 
Kosovo argued several times that the control from the organizations was too strict, they 
expressed that if KFOR did not protect them they would not be isolated in the enclaves. They 
would feel free to move around as they wanted, which would lead to a normal and usual 
integration of all groups in Kosovo. Strong views around the role of the UN evolved around 
how the organization affected the distance between groups. Their work was constantly 
criticized as it led to separation between minorities and most importantly between Albanians 
and the Serbs. Policymakers argue that there was no other solution, as history has shown them 
that there is a lot of tension between the groups and acting the way they did was the only way 
to act. But it is still central to point out that the separation and fear that was created was not 
natural, it was a political formations. There is nothing usual or ordinary a separation based on 
ethnicity within a state. The huge separation was constructed by fear and by assistance from 
the international forces. This outcome is obvious nothing positive as it will increase fear and 
suspicion between minorities. Once again this separation that the international forces 
contributed to gave feelings of “us vs. them”. The intention was without a doubt to protect the 
locals in Kosovo but the outcome was not what one would hope for. The strict control by the 
internationals was in order to lower the chances of conflicts and killings. However this strict 
protection gave birth a bigger separation. Being separated will not give any opportunities to 
integration or economic development. Therefore there will not be any progress in welfare in 
the state.  Yet it is important to note that being isolated can also create logic of community 
and a common identity. This form of isolation can also be a positive supply to protecting 
language and culture which increase thoughts of belonging (Higate & Henry 2009: 68-70). It 
seems like the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo only had one task and that was to stop 
violation between groups but the outcome was not what the international community 
formulated in the beginning (helping Kosovo in different spheres in order to make peace 
sustainable)which actually means that the international forces fastened the conflict (Higate & 
Henry 2009: 72-73). 
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4. Analysis  
The previous chapters lied out the ground for an analysis. Even this chapter will deal with the 
history of Kosovo but this chapter will discuss what happened in the region after the war. 
Vital to manifest is that the previous chapters evolving peacekeeping, responsibility to protect 
and the theories need to be kept in mind as the analysis will be dealing with those issues. 
Focus will lie on some specific events that took place after the war in order to demonstrate 
how the situation looked like in Kosovo after an intervention carried out by NATO. As 
mentioned in the first chapter the main focus point throughout the whole thesis is minorities 
and minority issues in Kosovo, these issues are therefore being treated here as well.  Further 
this chapter will also process the impact the international community had on Kosovo after the 
war. An evaluation of their work will be treated here. The last part of the chapter will evaluate 
what went wrong during the chosen incidents but also how Kosovo is managing to handle 
problems with minorities after their independence. 
4.1 Introduction  
The tension between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo has a unique history that is more 
complicated than other conflict within the region of Yugoslavia. The reason behind the war in 
Kosovo has a unique path, due to that Albanians do not share the same Slavic language with 
Bosnians, Serbs and Croats, Albanians have a separate language. Another factor is that 
Albanians never shared the yearning to be a part of Yugoslavia which in turn irritated many 
Yugoslavians as they wanted a bigger empire. Further, the Albanians did not have the same 
equal status as the other member states of Yugoslavia (Manning 2010: 108). These factors are 
important to memo as they triggered the war and the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia. 
Organizations with huge influence all over the world, most importantly Human Rights Watch, 
but also different organizations working with minority rights and minority issues evaluate that 
the conflict in Kosovo, not the war but the issues that arose after the war affected Kosovo in a 
disastrous way. The reason behind this is as problems with minorities became very evident. 
One might believe that after a humanitarian intervention the situation should get better, this 
was not the case in Kosovo, if anything, it became worse, despite the international assistance 
that Kosovo was receiving. What once happened to the Albanians in Kosovo; discrimination 
and violation by the Serbs was now happening to Serbs and other minorities present in 
Kosovo by Albanians. This means that the roles and the situations were reversed. The 
Albanians were a minority in Serbia, as Kosovo was a part of Serbia and not an independent 
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state. In today’s independent Kosovo, and also directly after the war when Kosovo became an 
autonomy, the Serbs became the minority. One might believe that the situation is not that 
peculiar as Kosovo has never been an independent state and does not have the knowledge or 
experience to govern a state. The hatred and feelings of revenge were still present, which 
mirrored in the years to come after the war. The blame should therefore not fall on Kosovo 
entirely. One might think that the international community is to blame as they have 
knowledge about the disputes between Kosovo and Serbia and should have more effective 
means to solve the problems. The aim for making the international community, especially 
UNMIK and KFOR in charge of Kosovo is to settle the disputes and provide the entire 
population with human rights (Human Rights Watch, 2004). They have experience with 
conflicts and should therefore have the knowledge and means to solve and prohibit such 
disasters.  
It is undeniable that Kosovo is a conflict affected region with a lot of issues left to solve, 
especially the ones concerning minorities and their status in the society. Kosovo is not only 
characterized by this but also by being one of those regions where international organizations 
and the international community has transferred money and resources in form of specialists 
and experts in order to settle the disputes and wrongs. It is about 13 years since the war ended 
in Kosovo and still today the international community is present, but most of the obligations 
fall under EU’s police- customs and juridical action mission in Kosovo (EULEX). Years and 
years of international presence and the situation is still shaky, not as it was directly after the 
war but far away from good.  
4.2 The situation in Kosovo after the war 
The war in Kosovo ended in 1999. During the war both Albanians and Serbs fled Kosovo. 
Mainly Albanians fled when the Serb forces attacked, killed and harassed them. When NATO 
intervened in Kosovo, Serbs fled Kosovo. 800 000 Albanians fled and 100 000 Serbs fled 
Kosovo during this period. The whole situation in Kosovo was a mess, Albanians fled north 
Mitrovica, which is known to be a Serb-dominated district, Serbs were fleeing Kosovo and 
leaving their homes athwart Kosovo. Obviously the outcome of these circumstances were not 
pleasant, it lead Kosovo into becoming a region divided by ethnicity. As will be discussed 
further on in this chapter, KFOR and UNMIK agreed on a mandate in Kosovo. When they 
first arrived in Kosovo directly after the war they were very understaffed until 2000, therefore 
1999 was a very unstable year in the region. As KFOR did not have enough staff or police the 
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only ones that were passable to use weapons were the previous members of KLA, which did 
not improve the situation but instead increased the fear among minorities in Kosovo. What is 
striking about these two organizations is that they were unwilling to undertake sufficient 
actions. UNMIK was understaffed, mainly when it came to police forces. KFOR, an 
international army, had as a mission to defend Kosovo from the Yugoslav forces, but KFOR’s 
only response in 1999 was to protect minorities through escorts and this occurred when 
KFOR was at its utmost potency. Little was done to show intolerance about harassments; no 
huge endeavors were made to arrest the ones that were responsible for the killings (Baldwin 
2006: 14). When the war came to an end the real problems in Kosovo became evident, it was 
apparent that Kosovo was facing huge challenges. The real problem was what will happen in 
Kosovo in the future but also how the region should be governed. Obviously these questions 
cannot be figured out over a night as they are dealing with the prospect of the region. These 
questions need a lot of work and without a doubt good guidance and supervision. It is not a 
surprise that a region like Kosovo, characterized by conflict and disputes, would not be able to 
guide and govern themselves as they do not have any knowledge or experience whatsoever 
when it comes to guide a country as throughout their whole history they have been under the 
influence of others; first the Ottoman Empire and later Serbia (Deda 2009: 3).   
Two similar promises were made from two different actors after the war but also before the 
NATO intervention; the international community promised to improve the situation in 
Kosovo, the purpose of an intervention was so settle the disputes and work towards respecting 
human rights. A similar promise was made after the war, when Hashim Thaci (Kosovo´s 
prime minister) stated that Kosovo is developing towards a multiethnic society. Not only did 
he actually express this but this statement is also affirmed on the flag, portraying six stars, 
each star representing a minority in Kosovo (important to note that the flag was introduce 
while discussing Kosovo’s independence). The two promises have couple of things in 
common, first; both state a better Kosovo where human rights and minority rights are 
respected and second none of the two actors actually managed to live up the promises. 
Unfortunately neither the international community nor Kosovo managed to live up what they 
expressed; some promises were obviously fulfilled but not everything. Being a free region, as 
Kosovo became after the war entails huge responsibilities. This is obviously not as easy as it 
sounds as the situation in Kosovo accelerated into a nightmare after the war. What 
characterizes Kosovo after the war is simply fear, minorities were constantly afraid of being 
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attacked, harassed and killed. This simply means that the fear of not being safe was constantly 
present among minorities (Baldwin 2006: 16).  
Being safe should without a doubt be a priority in Kosovo. Security is defined as follows; 
“The Parties undertake to take appropriate measures to protect persons who may be subjected 
to threats or acts of discrimination, hostility or violence as a result of their ethnic, cultural, 
linguistic or religious identity” (Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities, Article 6).   
Constant fear leads automatically to a segregated region, therefore what further characterized 
Kosovo after the war was segregation (Baldwin 2006: 18). After the war Kosovo came under 
the momentary administration of UN, a system was created in order to develop security 
among the people. In addition to UNMIK and KFOR the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) and EU were also involved in the system of security. UNMIK 
further had an obligation to create a qualified and objective Kosovo Police Service (KPS).  
Another obligation was to improve the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) with the aim to be 
Kosovo's future army, but after the war their main task was to undertake the role of being a 
crisis organization and respond to disasters in order to make safety possible for the 
population. They also had an obligation to be partial and guide the entire population when 
they needed humanitarian assistance.  All of these organizations that were present in Kosovo 
under the period had huge problems with cooperation; there was no teamwork whatsoever 
which lead the situation in Kosovo to turn in to a chaos without any organized missions and 
activities (Human Rights Watch, 2004). 
When discussing the period after the war in collaboration with safety for minorities it is 
important to note the three “s” words that the international community strives to offer 
minorities, unfortunately these promises were not fulfilled in Kosovo; security, space (homes) 
and sustainability. Everyday life became very hard for the minorities and in the end they 
believed they did not have any other choice but leave their homes, as they felt like they could 
not be assured by the international authorities that they would be safe in their own houses. It 
is understandable that the minorities reacted this way as all their rights were left aside. The 
authorities had promised to let them return to their homes, if the homes were destroyed the 
authorities would help them rebuild houses and most importantly they would protect them 
from forced sales of houses and homes.  Independent missions from countries were 
established in order to settle these issues; both British and American armies undertook these 
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tasks to cope with the issues but little effort was put into the missions (Baldwin 2006: 15).The 
situation in Kosovo was pointing towards minority abuse and ignorance of minority rights, the 
situation was further not in accordance with resolution 1244, the resolution adopted by the 
Security Council on 10 June 1999, which endorsed an international civil and military 
attendance in Kosovo that was supposed to be followed by both UNMIK and KFOR (United 
Nations Security Council, 1999, Resolution 1244). 
4.3 Kosovo under international rule 
As already discussed issues with minorities in Kosovo became huge problems, already in 
1999 the international community recognized the issue. UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and 
OSCE were trying to tackle the concerns in Kosovo. The aim of their work was to identify the 
problems and to figure out the best means to tackle them. Not only were UNHCR and OSCE 
working with these issues but help was also put in from KFOR and UNMIK. It was also 
KFOR and UNMIK that later took the matters in own hands as their mandate accorded them 
to help sort out problems in Kosovo. UNMIK later established Civil Affairs Minority Officers 
and later they also implemented an office that focused on human rights issues in general. 
During 2001 their work was finalized under the Office of Returns and Communities. The 
same year UNMIK set up a board to supply the people with information about minority rights 
but to also advice them on minority issues (Baldwin 2006: 12-13). 
In order to get a better insight in which organizations were present in Kosovo and what their 
main mission were the sections beneath gives a demonstration of the organizations that had a 
mandate in Kosovo but also their main tasks and obligations in Kosovo. It is important here to 
note that main focus will lie on KFOR and UNMIK as international organizations. The reason 
behind this is due to their influence which was important for Kosovo and the riots that will 
later be discussed. Further, the Kosovo Police Service will also be demonstrated as their 
involvement was crucial.  
4.3.1 Kosovo Force (KFOR) 
 The Kosovo war ended in 1999 with the removal of the Serbian troops from the province, 
and the establishment of a NATO-led KFOR to take over security in the province. UN 
Security Council Resolution 1244 mandated KFOR to be in charge over the situation in 
Kosovo; they were supposed to maintain a secure environment for all the people within the 
region (Judah 2008: 44). 
 
 
30 
 
Important to incorporate in this section is NATO, one of the main institutions involved in the 
question of Kosovo. After NATO’s intervention in Bosnia they proved their ability to carry 
out operations where there are no interests at stake. They simply undertook missions beyond 
the frame of the member states. As Bosnia (and Kosovo) is not a member of NATO they 
proved that they could and would manage conflicts around the world in order to establish 
human rights and make the world a safer place. After the war in Bosnia NATO gained an 
additional role; international actor in conflict management, and could undertake operations in 
order to support peace. NATO has since then had an obligation to maintain security in 
Europe.  As the intervention showed success in Bosnia NATO was motivated to also carry out 
an operation in Kosovo in order to put an end to violence. Discussions about NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo never seems to come to an end, debates have mixed opinions whether 
the intervention was right or wrong. The supports of the intervention argue that something had 
to be done in the Balkans as the people had been suffering enough under the Serbs. The ones 
that give a negative response to the intervention argue that the intervention was carried out too 
quick as hope for settling the situation in Kosovo with peaceful means was still alive but also 
that NATO broke a set of different international rules. The debates further point out that 
Unites States ignored the rules within the UN and carried out an intervention without 
accordance from the United Nation Security Council. This means that the United States got 
their will through even if member countries were against actions in Kosovo. Further this 
means that the mission served United States interests. By the enlargement of NATO the 
United States came closer to former enemies and had a bigger geographical spreading that 
makes them present in many corners of the world. This is therefore seen as a geographical 
interest from the American side (Ratti 2006: 99). Critics mean that NATO is trying to expand 
their politics as they firstly are a military alliance and when NATO was found this was the 
mission, but in today’s politics they have taken on other tasks. As the American influence in 
NATO is evident many critics point out that the United States is using the alliance to increase 
their influence in different regions is order to gain more international power and dominance. 
Criticism therefore point to the desire to be recognized as hegemony and the desire to spread 
American notions to parts of the world. American policymakers believe that an American 
involvement in European security is vital, by being present in different parts of the world 
would mean that world safety and security can be overlooked and monitored (Higate & Henry 
2009: 49-50). NATO is further an interesting subject to discuss in relation to the issues in 
Kosovo as Kosovo offered them an expansion when it comes to military. In today’s Kosovo 
the Unites States have established a military base that goes under the name Camp Bondsteel. 
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Also this factor strengthens the argument about the desire of hegemony (Higate & Henry 
2009: 51). Critics further discuss that United States has placed itself in the position that is to 
be considered as an arrangement for world security which means that they are using different 
institutions in order to gain more power and limit other powerful states influence in world 
politics. If these statements about the United States are true or not is very hard to tell, 
unfortunately this is how most of the debates concerning world politics goes but it is very 
important to also mention that there might have been interests and desires hat drove the 
intervention in Kosovo but in the end it is vital to point out that liberal notions and a desire to 
act in the name of human rights was present in Kosovo as well (Ratti 2006: 102). 
  4.3.2 United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
UNMIK was established in 1999 with a lot of tasks, but only those tasks relevant for the 
thesis will be mentioned here; protecting and promoting human rights but also, guarantee safe 
return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo (Jessen-Petersen 2006: 
7). Further, with the same resolution that established KFOR, the UN also created UNMIK. 
UNMIK was established to serve as a momentary administration for Kosovo and to promote 
the establishment of an independent Kosovo by promoting institutions in Kosovo. Under the 
direction of the UN, UNMIK is mainly responsible for police and the management of justice, 
civil administration, democratization, the empowerment of institutions and helping with 
economic. Other important tasks that fall under UNMIK is that they have to form a 
professional and fair KPS and until a fair KPS is established all responsibilities fall under 
UNMIK (Human Rights Watch, 2004). Many policymakers were not in accordance with the 
huge responsibility that the UNMIK had, they believed that all UN institutions in Kosovo 
were placed above the law making staff automatically more important than civilians. These 
negative attitudes towards the institution was also shared from the locals as they once and  for 
all thought that they would be able to have power over their own state but were now once 
again under the control of an actor outside of the region (Higate & Henry 2009: 47). 
4.3.3 The Kosovo Police Service (KPS) 
 As mentioned above UNMIK is also tasked with the creation of KPS. UNMIK and OSCE 
work together to train police officers for the new KPS. The first process of the training lead to 
176 fit police officers in 1999 in Vucitrn, a school for training police officers. The dedication 
to train police officers in Kosovo went on for a long period and lastly in March 2004, 5 700 
officers were ready to be deployed around Kosovo. These police officers still work under the 
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supervision of UNMIK and try to maintain a good cooperation with international authorities 
present in Kosovo. In order to create a powerful and fair KPS force the international staff 
managed to be successful in balancing ethnicity when educating the police officers. The 
variety of ethnicity it is important for civilians as they will gain trust for officers that share the 
same ethnicity: in largely ethnic Albanian areas the officers are Albanians and in ethnic 
Serbian areas the officers tend to be completely Serb (Deda 2009: 4). 
4.4 The international community’s failure to protect  
“The authorities have allowed a segregated society to develop and become entrenched, and 
thousands of minorities remain displaced” (Baldwin 2006: 13). 
Unfortunately scholars, researchers and international organizations are agreeing on the 
statement that transnational administrations failed in Kosovo. Why the peacekeeping 
operations were estimated to be a failure still goes unanswered. One cannot blame weak 
resources or lack of expertise as the organizations that overlooked the situation in Kosovo are 
experts enough when coming to solving and handling situations and regions like Kosovo.  
Since after the war there has constantly been events that have strengthen the argument that the 
international community failed Kosovo. Time and again there have been situations and events 
that have shown the international community’s inability to react and protect people. The most 
important event is the riots that occurred on March 17, 2004, the incident made the whole 
world turn their attention to Kosovo. The world believed that the situation in Kosovo was 
calming down; problems were finally being sorted out as the war ended years ago. This was 
not the case, constantly there were negligible incidents but the events in 2004 showed that the 
peak has been reached. In other words, as the organizations saw and witnessed the abuse and 
did not do everything in their power to hinder the situations, when they had the resources to 
do so, leads people to believe that they tolerated the division and harassments in Kosovo 
(Baldwin 2006: 15). 
Lastly, in order to end this section, it is important to point out that UNMIK’s biggest mistake 
in Kosovo was that they were not able to set up safe environments for the minorities, 
especially for the Serbs. Minorities had nowhere to return and were in constant fear of their 
lives. The way that UNMIK handled situations created huge debates around the world stating 
that they were passive when they had the power to establish peace. The number of displaced 
persons was very high in Kosovo, it was very important to build a society that was safe for 
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minorities to return to. The issue is not about people who desired to return, the issue is to 
create surroundings which means that people are able to return to their homes, they should 
have a free choice to decide if they want to return or not (Jessen-Petersen 2006: 8).                                                                  
4.4.1 Minorities in Kosovo – victims of violence  
Before treating the main incident that demonstrates the violations of human – and minority 
rights in Kosovo it is important to exhibit other events, not as large-scale, but events that are 
memorable in Kosovo and that explains under what living conditions minorities were trying to 
cope.  
After the war the roles were inverted, as mentioned earlier, the Serbs were now targets for 
discrimination and violence. Already direct after the war the violations, harassments and 
disputes started in Kosovo. When the war ended a lot of issues did not get solved, both 
Albanians and Serbs were filled with rage and anger. It was just a matter of time until 
something would break out. In February 2000, just months after the war ended, an outburst of 
violence took place and an attack on a UNHCR-run bus for minorities occurred. Another 
gesture of attacks on minorities took place about one year later with the bombing of a bus that 
was filled with Serbs and lead to the death of 10 people. These tragic events proved that there 
was no security or feelings of being safe among the minorities, they were in desperate fear. 
When there is no safety, feelings of being outside the society and feelings of being a target for 
violence automatically leads to segregation. What Kosovo actually needed was the opposite; 
integration. There is undeniably a huge need for integration among the people with different 
ethnic background in order to make peace sustainable. It is not pleasurable to live in a place 
where ones language or religion is not respected, this is not only a violation of rights but it 
also is a feature that makes Kosovo a profoundly segregated and alienated society. Other 
problems that are evident in Kosovo are the problems with education, health assistance and 
social assistance. These problems were apparent in Kosovo until 2006, when the international 
authorities finally came up with a better, not flawless but better solution for these issues; this 
means that setting up a valid justice system has taken a very long time. When discussing the 
segregated education system the internationals have not tried to make any changes. The 
education system has been divided since 1990 but after the war it became more visible. The 
Serbian and the Albanian children were taught in two different ways, different language and 
different culture. UNMIK tried to introduce mixed schools but as the Serbs were very furious 
and their rage resulted in a wave of violence therefore the proposal was inhibited. What is 
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important to mention here is that the international authorities have not organized or developed 
a proper strategy concerning anti-discrimination. Finally in 2004 a strategy was finalized, 
obviously very late, but showed some progress in the matter as it was based on EU principles. 
Developing a multiethnic Kosovo, which was a goal and a task is no longer rational. What has 
been done in Kosovo instead is that the different forces, without purpose, promoted a division 
in institutions. An evident example is the health care, the Serbs are harassed in Albanian 
hospitals and Albanians are harassed in Serbian hospitals. In Mitrovica the Serbian hospital 
refused to take in Albanians and treat them. Instead of tackling this issue and trying to 
promote a united Kosovo the international community respected and encouraged a divided 
hospital system (Baldwin 2006: 14-19). Property and the use of language were also denied to 
minorities during this harsh period. The international staff believed that it would be better to 
organize a commission to deal with property claims but the commission did not have enough 
resources in order to solve problems in a fair way. The international administrations could not 
do anything about the living situation and were forced to be inactive as people were driven 
from their homes. This means that even though the internationals wanted to change the 
situation and organized a commission they were not dedicated to really solve problems. 
Language is a very sensitive subject as it is a basic human right but many people in Kosovo 
were denied this right. Minorities around Kosovo were afraid to speak their own language, 
this concerning the Albanians as well, especially in Mitrovica. Laws about language were 
well written and formulated but were not really incorporated in Kosovo. This means that the 
internationals have put a lot of effort on formulating laws and trying to establish institutions 
and commissions but in practice very little was done (Baldwin 2006: 19-22). Luckily enough 
some progress was made during 2003 and 2004 started to look bright as well. In March 2004 
Jean-Christian Cady, UNMIK’s head of justice and policing said: “Kosovo is a good example 
of what the international community and the United Nations can achieve to stop ethnic 
cleansing and build policy instruments that will prevent it from occurring again”. Only parts 
of this statement is actually true, the previous sections assure that progress in Kosovo was not 
always visible, further it would be wrong to state that nothing has been done. Therefore the 
quotation is only partly true as many of the tasks that the organizations had were not fulfilled. 
There were concerns and harassments in the region and neither UNMIK nor KFOR had 
ensured that minority groups could exercise their rights to live freely in Kosovo. 
Unfortunately the situation was about to become worse as bad incidents were yet to come. 
March 2004 was once again a period that showed that the two main bodies obligated to look 
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over the situation in Kosovo failed, and this after being present in the region for about five 
years (Baldwin 2006: 16).  
4.4.2 The Kosovo Riot   
In 2004, on March 17, riots by ethnic Albanians took place throughout Kosovo. The reason 
behind this was false claims blaming Serbs for drowning Albanian children. The Albanians 
reacted by rioting which lead to 33 riots all over the region. Reports show that around 50 000 
people were involved in the riots. Many people lost their lives; obviously the Serb minorities 
around Kosovo were most affected. The riots got out of control and lead to injuries among 
plenty of international staff and solders as well. The aim was to destroy as many houses and 
remove as many non-Albanians from the region. Everything that was considered to belong to 
the Serbs had to be destroyed while Albanian homes went untouched.  During the riots a lot of 
cultural monuments were also destroyed, Albanians burned down around 30 Orthodox 
churches. Albanians simply wanted to turn Kosovo into something “pure” Albanian with no 
trace from Serbs or other minorities and all of this happened in a time frame of 48 hours. The 
situations lead to people being displaced and houseless. The events of March showed a huge 
setback in the development of creating a multi-ethnic Kosovo. Serbs and other minorities 
were frequently waiting for UNMIK and KFOR to come and rescue them, but they were left 
alone with insecurities whether they will survive or not. They were constantly waiting for the 
ethnic Albanians to harass and attack them. The events of March lead to the displacement of 
around 4 000 people, mainly Serbs. French KFOR was set in Svinjare, not even a kilometer 
away from the killing and the house burning in the village. The crowd of rioters passed the 
base and the French soldiers were not able to hinder the violence. The village was burned 
down in front of the troops. Svinjare is a very small village with maximum 140 houses, every 
house was burned down and the complete village was destroyed. Another French troop was 
set in Vucitrn, they also failed to protect the locals and let the burning of Roma homes 
happen. The German soldiers were for most of the part set in Prizren, a small but very cultural 
city that also was affected by the riots. The Serbian churches were destroyed despite the 
presence of the soldiers. All ruins of old Serbian culture was destroyed in order to entirely 
eliminate the Serbian history in Kosovo. The Germans left many of the churches as fast as 
they saw crowds of Albanians looking to vandalize the buildings. There were thousands of 
Serbs living in Prizren but after March the number was estimated to be less the 40 Serbs. 
Kosovo Polje, a small city outside of Pristina also witnessed the riots. When the crowds 
entered the city KFOR and UNMIK was nowhere to be found which gave the Albanians an 
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open area to destroy and burn minority homes. Due to lack of help the Albanians were able to 
not only destroy houses but also a Serbian school and a Serbian hospital. Further the Italian 
troops were present in Pec where houses were built for Serbs that lost their homes earlier. All 
of the houses aimed for the Serbs were destroyed even though the Italian KFOR was nearby. 
When Serbs asked for help they refused to approach them. Once again they failed to help the 
people which lead to another city being destroyed. The Serb population in Djakovica was also 
affected, before March there were only five elderly Serb women living there, other Serbs left 
the city way before. When the riots broke out KFOR undertook an obligation to protect the 
women but this was not the case. As the international forces knew that the main mission in 
Djakovica was to get rid of the elderly women they had time to organize protection and hinder 
a disaster in the city, but that did not happen. Even in the capital Pristina rioters burned down 
apartments that belonged to Serbs. What also is important to mention in this section is that the 
entire burden cannot fall on the international staff as the international staff had for a very long 
time educated KPS officers in order to solve situations in Kosovo, but the KPS officers did 
not do what was expected from them. Many times they were passive and let the Albanians 
burn down Serb homes and harass people. After the riots many minorities declared that the 
KPS officers several times helped the rioters during the violence. Still we cannot avoid the 
fact that many KPS were recently trained and did not carry any huge experience in monitoring 
difficult situations. It goes without saying that the officers did not handle the situations well as 
they effectively took sides with the Albanians by only standing by and letting harassments 
escalate. They many times also only arrested Serbs but no Albanians that were breaking the 
law. On the other side there also were officers that acted professionally and did everything in 
their power to stop violence in order to protect Serbs. When looking at Kosovo’s history it is 
not strange that many KPS policemen joined the Albanians as feelings of hatred and revenge 
was in attendance (Human Rights Watch, 2004).  
The international hope for creating a multiethnic Kosovo was not reachable. The disasters of 
March showed that Kosovo was facing huge challenges. Interesting to note is that while the 
situation developed into human disaster the public eye were asking where the international 
assistance was when the riots were occurring. International politicians kept asking the 
question of how come such a disaster can take form when the international community is 
present. Every corner of Kosovo was guarded and monitored by international forces and still 
the disaster took place (Human Rights Watch, 2004). After the tragic event minorities have 
expressed that when calling for assistance, UNMIK and KFOR came very late and claimed 
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that they could only evacuate the minorities but not protect them. The situation that was 
occurring was not something unexpected or new, these kinds of conditions were present in 
Kosovo since the end of the war and still after five years the international community did not 
know how to solve difficult situations, situations they were obligated to handle. Simply 
speaking the aim of having the international community present was to settle the difficult 
situations in Kosovo and they did not deliver as expected. The internationals many times, in 
order to defend themselves, blamed the Kosovo politicians for letting situations get violent. 
Unfortunately many critics drew the conclusion that security organizations failed in Kosovo. 
The unrest in March showed the inability of KFOR, UNMIK but also KPS to handle rare 
situations. This simply means that the international community failed Kosovo’s minorities 
when they needed help the most. Obviously during the riots the organizations were present 
but showed inability to react and were many times considered as passive (Baldwin 2006: 16). 
The situation in Kosovo showed the organizations credibility should be questioned. They 
simply did not live up to the expectations and the promises they made before entering 
Kosovo. These organizations have a lot of experience with peacekeeping operations therefore 
it is not understandable why they put huge responsibilities on KPS. It is not reasonable how 
they can expect that a police force based on ethnic Albanians would act fairly during the 
occasion. What further is interesting is that the international organizations and their officials 
mostly blamed the leaders in Kosovo for the failings. They further stated that it was a matter 
that should have been sorted out by the local leadership and that the organizations did what 
they were supposed to do. The internationals claimed that they wanted to keep the situation 
calm and that is why they reacted as they did but debates show that remaining calm was not 
what was required in Kosovo. The UN Security Council did not have any arguments for 
protecting the forces and their deficiencies. It was after all the Security Council that agreed on 
a mandate in Kosovo but was not able to motivate the soldiers and the staff to carry out their 
tasks (Human Rights Watch, 2004).  
The incident shows that minorities in Kosovo have a hard time trusting the international 
organizations as they did not deliver when they were asked to. Being present in the region and 
not employ proper means leads people and especially locals to believe that the international 
forces are ignoring their missions. Important to mention is that there is of course an obligation 
that falls upon the Kosovo leadership to direct the situation but when knowing the background 
problem; ethnic cleansing of Albanians by Serbs, the situation should not have been left to the 
Kosovo police. Kosovo has not been independent or had any form of power; therefore 
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managing situations like those that occurred in March is likely to be difficult. They did not 
have the knowledge or experience to deal with difficult situations. What on the other hand is 
confusing is that the international community did not have lack of resources or expertise but 
still did not manage the situation in the best possible way (Judah 2008: 64).  
4.5 Reasons for failure  
Human Rights Watch points to more than a few reasons for the failures in Kosovo: the first 
issue that Human Rights Watch addresses is the lack of responsiveness by UNMIK and 
KFOR. It is obvious that the organizations were not prepared for the riots and the violence 
and could not organize anything in order to hinder the situation. But as the international 
community was aware of the conditions in the region they should have been more alert and 
more effective in handling unexpected situations. What is interesting to mention here is that 
journalists that were present in Mitrovica wrote that riots are about to break out but these 
claims were not taken into consideration by the internationals. As the French KFOR was 
placed nearby one would believe that they would be aware of situations as they were 
witnessing everything that was going on in the area. This further means that UNMIK and 
KFOR point towards a lack of capacity. The second reason is estimated to be that UNMIK 
and KFOR did not have enough recourse in form of troops to deal with the widespread attacks 
that were taking place all over Kosovo. Reason number three is projected to be that troops 
were improperly trained to deal with the riots. A problem is further that the troops had very 
little experience in dealing with riots and did therefore not know how to manage the situation 
in the best possible way. Critics mean that this explanation should not be valid as international 
forces should be prepared for any possible situation. Another reason for failure is the lack of 
organization between KFOR, UNMIK and KPS. The communication between these forces 
was very poor. These forces also turned against each other and were trying to blame each 
other instead of taking their responsibilities. The situation in Kosovo could have been 
managed in a different way if the forces were unified. The next issue that Human Rights 
Watch points out is that the international institutions were themselves under attack and needed 
first to protect themselves. Many of their vehicles were burned down during the riots. KFOR 
soldiers were also attacked as well at KPS police. They therefore mean that even if they had 
the ability to protect the people they could not have changed the situation as they themselves 
were targets of the riots. They did what was asked of them in order to protect minorities, 
many times also risking their own lives (Human Rights Watch, 2004). Another reason for 
believing that the international community failed in Kosovo is because they changed the 
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situation in Kosovo by isolating different groups and not letting them interact with each other. 
They aimed to make people more secure but due to the high “security” they actually made 
people feel more insecure and managed to make the division between people more visible. 
Basic activities like going to the shop was restricted, minorities, especially Serbs were afraid 
to get out of their comfort zone and buy food as they were afraid that they would come in 
contact with Albanians or that they would be attacked. The organizations established roads for 
minorities to use in order to avoid the main roads. Albanians on the other hand tried to avoid 
these established roads in order to not meet any Serbs. The region was characterized by 
dividing roads and in turn divided people. The ideas behind these developments were without 
a doubt aiming for good outcomes and aiming to protect the people but the outcome was not 
what was intended as it strengthened the feelings of “us vs. them”. Simple things such as 
taking buses were divided between the minorities.  The peacekeeper had “protected buses” 
which only took minorities from one place to another in order to eliminate contact with other 
minorities or Albanians. Unfortunately many locals believe that the work of UNMIK and the 
UN in general has increased isolation between Albanians and Serbs (Higate & Henry 2009: 
78-82). The last reason for believing that the international community failed in Kosovo has to 
do with the high expectation that locals put on peacekeepers, but in order to reach progress 
there has to be cooperation between all the parts that are involved.  When organizations arrive 
to a troubled region the locals tend to believe that the organizations should sort out all the 
problems, which is of course impossible as success can only be tenable when all parts 
involved are committed. When UN and NATO came to Kosovo the locals believed that they 
would sort out the whole situation, and when this did not happen they claimed that the 
international forces were not committed enough. Further the locals many times point their 
attention towards R2P and that the internationals did not live up to the doctrine. When every 
task was not fulfilled the locals were disappointed and accused UN for failing them (Higate & 
Henry 2009: 102-103).  
4.6 The high expectation on international missions  
Documentations that UN should aim for reads as follows;  
“Each peacekeeping operation has a set of mandated tasks, but all share certain common aims 
– to alleviate human suffering, and create conditions and build institutions for self-sustaining 
peace” (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1948)  
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When reading the paragraph it is understandable that the locals put high expectations on 
international forces. But what is important to mention is that documents, paragraphs and 
promises can be perceived in different ways, the locals might perceive them in a way that was 
not intended from the organizations. Therefore it is natural that misunderstandings about the 
tasks emerge. The locals might expect too much from the peacekeepers but many tasks might 
not fall under their mandate. This entails that there is a divided understanding of what to 
expect from the peacekeepers (Higate & Henry 2009: 104). If the peacekeepers fail with 
doing something that the locals expect them to do they will immediately lose their trust. Many 
will therefore believe that the whole peacekeeping operation is useless. Unfortunately the 
locals also sometimes believe that the peacekeepers “do not care” but this might not be the 
case as peacekeepers also have an obligation that prioritize the safety of peacekeeping 
personnel over civilians at certain moments. The peacekeepers do not only need to protect the 
locals but also their fellow personnel. This therefore means that the peacekeepers tasks and 
work often is misjudged (Higate & Henry 2009: 105). What further is imperative to note is 
that the locals and especially minorities numerous times believe that international 
organizations choose sides and work in favor of a specific minority. A good example is when 
the French troops were seen by the Albanians to “favor the Serbs”. The Albanians believed 
that the French troops were “pro-Serb”. The perception that the French failed to treat 
Albanians and Serbians as equals was most strongly expressed in regard to Mitrovica, where 
questions were raised in regard to the French troop’s inability to protect Albanians in the 
south of Mitrovica (Higate & Henry 2009: 133). 
4.7 Kosovo after 2004 until the independence  
Marti Ahtisaari, former president of Finland, was appointed to lead debates in order to 
determine the future status of Kosovo. The Ahtisaari plan was formulated by including The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which means that it is binding to promote and 
respecting human- and minority rights (Manning 2010: 109). The involvement of the 
minorities in discussions about the future status has been very limited. It is often discussed 
that decentralization should be the main order to solve minority issues in Kosovo, but it seems 
like discussions are moving towards creation of Serb municipalities in order to give them 
more power and freedom in Kosovo. In 2006 the situation of minorities in Kosovo was 
projected to be the worst in Europe. In addition to this Kosovo also had one of the highest 
numbers of displaced people. Kosovo is a very small region to have so many ethnically 
divided towns and villages. Nowhere in Europe is there such fear among minorities that they 
 
 
41 
 
will be attacked for speaking their own language, a language that is not considered the “right” 
language. Something has to be done; a region settled in the centre of Europe cannot be 
characterized with such fear and insecurity. The international community has failed in many 
aspects. Lessons must be learned; new ideas and new agreements have to be recognized in 
Kosovo. The problem is not lack of resources. Millions of Euros and thousand of international 
officials have been transferred to Kosovo. The resources that were established in Kosovo 
were very high in reflection to the small population that is expected to be about 2 million. The 
peacekeeping operation in Kosovo is believed to be the most expensive operation that 
international organizations undertook but unfortunately the resources have not been shared 
and used effectively or wisely. No long term solution has been established, Serbs have been 
turning to Belgrade for protection and not to the place where they are located; Kosovo 
(Baldwin 2006: 23-25). UNMIK did, as it shows, not have enough involvement and expertise 
to solve minority problems in Kosovo and it is only during the last couple of years that they 
began communication with the UN’s minority experts in Geneva (Baldwin 2006: 27). Once 
again, it is wrong and unfair to only guilt the international community for the lack of success 
in Kosovo. Much of the responsibility also falls on Kosovo but what is interesting and worth 
mentioning is that Serbia has been seen as an obstacle for letting Kosovo develop in the right 
direction; towards a united and integrated Kosovo as they have for a long time kept the Serb 
minority in check. The Serbian leaders in Serbia argue that as Kosovo is not willing to support 
the Serbian minority they will do it by funding for healthcare, education, social welfare and 
infrastructure. The purpose is to keep the Serb minority under political control but also 
enabling them to integrate in the community they are actually living in. Further, Serbia is 
constantly showing that they will not support an independent Kosovo, as Kosovo will always 
belong to them, which actually means that it is an obstacle for Kosovo and the will to have 
complete autonomy over the state and the citizens. Belgrade has also expressed that those who 
are against an independent Kosovo will be taken care of by Belgrade, which is comforting for 
many minority groups in Kosovo but also scary at the same time as they are afraid to enjoy 
benefits that Kosovo might provide. Serbia is simply keeping these people as captives in order 
to make their own ideas and desires go through (Manning 2010: 111-112). What is more 
devastating is that the youth is also being included as Belgrade do not believe it is necessary 
for Serbian children in Kosovo to learn any Albanian as they are citizens of Serbia, these 
education policies troubles the youth as it  leads to problems for employment opportunities in 
a nation where the majority speaks Albanian. Belgrade is simply against everything that could 
lead to integration for minorities in Kosovo (Manning 2010: 113).  
 
 
42 
 
Lastly, in order for the situation in Kosovo to be characterized by peace it is important that all 
parts involved in the region are committed to improvement. What is supplementary important 
to note is that it is not a solution to isolate minorities and make them afraid of each other. 
Developing Kosovo means that people need to be free and secure; this can only be reached 
when all parties are determined to change. Still, it is vital to have assistance and help from 
outer forces in order to turn Kosovo into a peaceful region (Baldwin 2007: 2). 
5. Conclusion 
As the thesis and especially the analysis have established the international community did not 
manage to live up to their tasks in Kosovo. Unfortunately there is not a concrete answer to 
why the mission in Kosovo did not live up to their responsibilities and tasks. It is important to 
mention that there are a lot of reasons behind the response from the locals about the issue that 
the international community failed them. When one thinks of the UN and all the organizations 
that are involved one believes that the world is a safe place. Injustice will be eliminated as the 
world enjoys different institutions and organizations that work within different fields, such as; 
discrimination, development, ethnic cleansing and poverty. Huge projects and huge amount of 
resources are dedicated to different fields in order to reach justice and human rights. The 
international community with all its components are fighting the “bad” and leading the world 
towards a protected and comfortable world. Unfortunately this is not how reality looks like for 
many people around the world. The international community keeps failing people when they 
do not live up to their tasks and when they do not carry out the work that is given them. Not 
only are they failing people but they are not doing their jobs adequately. They themselves 
formulated the highly respected doctrineR2P, in paper the doctrine is very well written and 
gives the international community, but also the individual state a huge responsibility. 
Unfortunately the doctrine is only respected and well formulated on paper but in practice it 
seems like it does not have any value whatsoever.  
It is not odd to understand the arguments and the disappointments that the locals in Kosovo 
addressed as they strongly believed that the international community once and for all would 
settle the situation in Kosovo, the peacekeeping operation was their last hope, and therefore it 
is understandable that they reached a doubtful opinion about the international forces that were 
present in Kosovo. Not only are people within Kosovo doubting the organizations and 
questioning their credibility but the whole international community is being questioned. It is a 
huge mistake to fail in a place like Kosovo as conflicts have been going on for ages, the 
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region is characterized by poverty, slow development, segregation, unemployment, no 
credible institutions and of course no tenable human rights. The international community had 
an opportunity to prove themselves and make the world understand that they base their work 
on liberal notions but they did not earn the respect from the locals. When the international 
forces needed to prove themselves they did not deliver. The situation in Kosovo shows that it 
is not strange that the world believes that the UN is not as helpful as they claim to be. When 
the international community fails it leads people to doubt organizations and administrations as 
they do not understand the point of having them when they do not fulfill their tasks. 
TheR2P is, as mentioned above, a respected doctrine and a very liberal one as well. R2P 
brings forward the best part of liberalism; interdependence, globalization, not letting injustice 
characterizes the world but morality and obligation to help and protect people in need. 
Unfortunately the international community, saying they focus on liberal notions did not live 
up to their goal. As mentioned in previous chapters the doctrine R2P can be up for discussion 
and has loopholes which mean that forces can twist and turn the doctrine in any direction they 
want in order to make the concept suit them. It is obviously wrong to state that R2P totally 
failed in Kosovo as one of the tasks is to intervene in a state when the own government is not 
willing to help the people. This is what happened in Kosovo but unfortunately the people in 
Kosovo did not believe that the forces did everything in their power for protecting and 
promoting human rights. This sadly makes people doubt liberalism and the argument that the 
international community bases their work on liberal ideas. This unfortunately leads people to 
see more valid arguments about interventions and operations in realism. As already 
established realism mean that actors only undertake missions in order to promote own 
interests. Missions are aiming to promote political and strategic interests. Which means that 
the international community organized a mission in order to promote own interests. As it is 
known that USA was mostly involved in the issue of Kosovo, but did not reach any good 
solutions about minority issues, implies that the United States were willing to send missions 
to Kosovo in order to promote interests. As critics argue, Kosovo is an important strategic 
place which connects the whole Europe and is therefore an important location. When the 
United States have friendly relations to Kosovo they will also be able to have influence in 
Europe. If influence in Europe is reached then the Unites States are present in every corner of 
the world and can overlook all situations.  
Further, the cold war relations are not gone, United States want to prove that their voice and 
power is more important than Russia. Russia and China were against an intervention in 
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Kosovo but the United States ignored them and established an intervention after all. By 
reacting the way the United States did mean that they broke several different laws and norms 
within the UN. When the United States, one of the core members in the UN, breaks the law 
and ignores liberal norms by not respecting the voice and veto of other states leaves people 
doubting and loosing trust for the UN as they will believe that missions are chosen selectively 
and influenced by interests. 
It is further important to mention that even if most facts point towards realism and lead people 
to think that the international community failed their missions as they did not protect and 
solve situations in Kosovo liberalism should not be ruled out. The ideas behind the 
intervention were liberal; the main focus was to actually save the people and act in a moral 
way. But what is blurry is what happened after the intervention. The same actors that carried 
out the intervention argued for human rights and their responsibility to protect, faded away 
after the war ended. The liberal ideas should not only be present during the intervention but 
also after. It is after the war when liberalism really can be spread and be promoted. It is also 
after the war when the actors really can demonstrate that they believe in liberalism and work 
under the principles that liberalism point out. This was not the case; the actors that once 
argued that human rights should be on top of agendas were now not living up to their own 
statements. As liberalism is a theory that has its main focus on the individuals it is odd that the 
international community did not respect the most important statement from the theory they 
claimed to be working under. The people in Kosovo did not get the impression that their 
rights were the most important tasks in the work that the international forces carried out. It is 
not a humanitarian move to leave people afraid of being and living in their own homes.  
Another reason for leading people all over the world to doubt the liberal ideas that 
international organizations formulate has to do with the issue that local populations are 
abandoned and not protected when they require it the most. Minorities are especially affected 
the hardest as they believe that they are left aside and that their rights are not valuable. The 
main challenge in Kosovo was not to end the war but to help sort out the situation. The real 
challenge was how to deal with minorities and disputes after the war, this was the real 
challenge for the international community. It is therefore strange to legitimate that the 
international forces did not manage to maintain their main task, a task that they are well 
qualified to sort out. It is strange that the administrations were agreeing on helping the people 
of Kosovo out of their misery by ending the war but when their credibility was set to the test 
they were nowhere to be found. Nowhere in Kosovo where people feeling safe, they knew 
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that NATO ended the war but their misery and suffering did not end with the war, 
harassments and torture was yet to come. It is obvious that Kosovo was a failed state and was 
in transition therefore it goes without saying that Kosovo desperately needed the help from 
the peacekeepers.  
What the thesis simply state is that the reasons for an intervention might be liberal; this was at 
least the case in Kosovo. The liberal arguments dominated the intervention. There was no 
doubt that same mistakes could not be repeated in Kosovo as in Bosnia. As the international 
society failed in other parts of the world they did not want to put their credibility in risk and 
were therefore determined to help the people in Kosovo. They were very quick to carry out 
actions to stop the killing and stop the situation before it accelerated into a bigger disaster. 
The same quick actions were not visible after the intervention.  The situation in Kosovo states 
that there was a motivation and a will to stop what was going on, hence the intervention. But 
the same motivation was not present afterwards. This means that the intervention in general 
was liberal but the aftermath points towards realism. No state and no actor is willing to send 
out soldiers on mission and spend resources on places that will not provide them with gains. 
On the other hand it is important to mention that when a soldier does not risk his own life or 
the lives of his fellow personnel does not mean that he ignored tasks.  A soldier is further 
obligated to protect his own men; the protection of fellow soldiers is also seen as a moral 
obligation and a task within the mission. We can here discuss the value of life and whose life 
is more valuable. It is without a doubt a discussion within philosophy to try to understand 
whether one life is more important than another. It is of course a very difficult situation for a 
soldier to risk his own life to protect another person whose life is in danger. It is also 
important to mention that a soldier can do as much as he is told; he cannot overstep his tasks 
in order to save people. A mission requires dedication from soldiers but it also requires that 
soldiers follow what they are supposed to do and not take on situations that are outside the 
mission. It is therefore wrong to blame soldiers for not risking their own lives in order to save 
the locals. What on the other hand could be affirmed is that soldiers and the peacekeeping 
operation did not fully live up to all the tasks that they had. Further this implies that 
peacekeeping operations might not always be seen as liberal. It seems that when intervening 
they use liberalism to camouflage their interest, when they have reached their goal they back 
down and do not put in more effort to develop a stable environment in a region. Simply 
speaking; when the international community argues that they follow the liberal principles and 
that they have a responsibility to protect people when their own government is not willing to 
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do so is shown, in the case of Kosovo, to not be true.  As the international community 
implemented  Resolution 1244 the peacekeeping forces had no choice but to be present in 
Kosovo, what they on the other hand had a choice over was how engaged to be in solving 
disputes. As the analysis showed the international community failed many times to protect 
civilians. Unfortunately this leaves the public eye to believe that the situation in Kosovo after 
the war was facing a realist nature.  
What is supplementary significant to mention is that it might be a bit too deep to look at the 
situation in Kosovo based on two theories. As the two theories are very separate, different but 
also each other’s opposite. Therefore it would be a bit harsh to draw a conclusion based on 
two theories that are the exact opposite to each other. This further means that it is too ruthless 
to draw a conclusion whether the situation in Kosovo really had a realist nature as the analysis 
show that the international community actually worked and tried to find solutions to 
problems. To characterize the aftermath of the war to either be liberal or realist might not be a 
logical conclusion. The reason behind this is that situations show that both liberalism and 
realism was present in Kosovo after the war and the intervention from NATO.  Studying 
international relations and international conflicts means that there is no definite answer to a 
problem or a definite answer to a conflict as nothing within the field can be considered black 
or white. Conflicts and wars are more complicated than that. It is therefore possible; at least it 
is worth including, that the aftermath of the war might be a combination of the two theories. It 
is too complex to mark the events with one theory. What on the other hand is interesting is 
that throughout the thesis new questions came to the surface. Instead of trying to categorize 
conflicts within theories it is maybe more effective to look at different conflicts and wars and 
try to figure out if missions work, but also when, how and why they work. The outcome of the 
thesis is, as mentioned above, shows that both realism and liberalism were present in Kosovo. 
Many critics are united in their opinion when claiming that the peacekeepers failed the 
population of Kosovo and claim that the operation was based on American interests. They 
further did not do any huge progress in sorting out issues with minorities, as mentioned above 
the minority situation in Kosovo was a disaster. The international community had the 
knowledge, the resources and the expertise to settle these issues. Why this was not the case 
once again leads us to believe that realism was directing the work of the organizations. But 
what on the other hand is worth mentioning is that in order for progress to occur in a conflict 
prone region dedication from all the parts need to be visible. As the chapters above implies, 
the Serbian authorities tried to freeze the progress and the integration of minorities. This 
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means that the international community tried to settle situations but the dedication from all 
parts was not present.       
In order to draw a conclusion whether the aftermath of the war in Kosovo had a realist or 
liberal nature it is once again important to take into consideration that different actors state 
different things, the locals in Kosovo would most obviously state that the international 
community failed them but the international community would emphasize that they worked 
under liberal notions and goals. As the thesis was aiming for only discussing the issue of 
Kosovo it is important to note that the conclusion only concerns Kosovo, if other conflicts 
were analyzed the outcome might have been different. One case is therefore too narrow in 
order to reach an opinion about peacekeeping operations in general.  When more cases are 
discussed it is easier to draw conclusion, it would also be easier to draw conclusions about 
Kosovo as the case could be compared with other cases and hopefully a pattern would be 
visible. It is therefore important to keep in mind that only one case was studied in this thesis 
therefore the conclusion is only based on the Kosovo case. The aim of the thesis was to 
evaluate whether the aftermath of the war in Kosovo took a liberalist or a realist nature. This 
aim is consequently reached; the nature was a mix of both liberalist and realist inputs. The 
aims of the operation were combined. The liberal statement were; helping the people of 
Kosovo and just by having an international force present in Kosovo with huge resources is a 
liberal move while the realist statements were; pursuing interests, especially American 
interests such as strengthen hegemony . Still it is important to mention that many facts point 
towards failure of liberal promises in Kosovo but it is not fair to claim that the aftermath 
should be characterized with realism.  
Lastly, when trying to answer the question if the international community lived up to their 
promises it is of value to state that the question is very complex. The answer can have 
different answers depending on whom and how many people we direct the question to. Then, 
this means that another method, which was mentioned in the first chapter, which deals with 
participatory design, would be of high value in order to reach a conclusion about the 
questions. It is therefore worth pointing out that applying another method to this thesis would 
be more valuable. But if the formulation of the questions would be different; did the 
peacekeeping operation and the international inputs in Kosovo work, the answer is most 
definitely yes. The reason behind the positive answer is that due to the international operation 
the chance for peace became higher. There is no doubt that bigger conflicts and right 
violations would occur if the international community was not present in Kosovo. It is 
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important to look at the whole operation and not only focus on that the military failed to live 
up to their expectations, the economical and political field was improved in Kosovo. 
Institutions were established that helped people in need. These factors are very important for 
the future of Kosovo as they lay the basis for a good development and sustainable peace. 
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